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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH , : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : 
: Case No. 20060477-CA 
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON, 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is the State's appeal from an order, issued by Judge West, dismissing, with prejudice, 
charges of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, an enlianced first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§58-37-8(l)(iii)(West 2004), interference with an arresting officer, 
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§76-8-305(West 2004), and intoxication, 
a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-9-70 l(l)(West 2004). Appellee agrees 
with the State that this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(West 2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. DOES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIRE POLICE TO 
INFORM AN ARRESTEE THAT HE IS UNDER ARREST BEFORE 
TAKING HIM INTO CUSTODY? 
II. DID OFFICER BOOTS HAVE THE REQUISITE PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO ARREST THE DEFENDANT FOR INTOXICATION? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's finding of facts should be re viewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's conclusions of law should 
be reviewed for correctness. This is a search and seizure case, therefore this Court should 
grant the trial court's legal determinations a measure of discretion in applying the standard 
to the given facts. See, State v. Valdez, 68 P.3d 1052, 1054 (Ct. App. 2003). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court when the Defendant's attorney filed a 
written motion to suppress the evidence, the State's response, the parties' oral arguments 
and the trial court's ruling. (R. 026-027, 019-025, 039-045, 051-052, 068-071,090-092). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) Prohibited acts--Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A ~ Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly 
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and intentionally: 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
Section 76-9-701(1). Intoxication - Release of arrested person or placement in a 
detoxification center. 
(1) A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of alcohol, a 
controlled substance, or any substance having the property of releasing toxic vapors, 
to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, in a public place or in a 
private place where he unreasonably disturbs other persons 
77-7-6. Manner of making arrest. 
(1) The person making the arrest shall inform the person being arrested of his intention, 
cause, and authority to arrest him. Such notice shall not be required when: 
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will endanger the life or safety of the officer or 
another person or will likely enable the party being arrested to escape; 
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to 
commit, an offense; or 
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately after the commission of an offense 
or an escape. 
Section 78-2a-3(j)(2003) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from 
the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by information with possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, an enhanced first-degree felony, interference with an 
arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor and intoxication, a class C misdemeanor. On 
January 12, 2006, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence. (R. 019-026). The 
State responded with a written objection to the motion to suppress. (R. 039-045). Oral 
arguments on the motion were held on February 8,2006. Following the evidentiary hearing, 
the trial court granted the Defendant's motion to suppress, ruling that the Fourth 
Amendment requires an officer to inform an individual that they are under arrest, (R. 071-
071), and that the officers went beyond their scope in detaining the defendant on a Terry 
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stop, and there was no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain the defendant in the 
first place. (R.094). 
The trial court dismissed the information, with prejudice, on May 3, 2006. (R. 67). 
The State filed this appeal on May 15, 2006. (R. 074), and the Utah Supreme Court 
transferred jurisdiction of the appeal to this Court on May 31, 2006. (R. 077). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On November 27, 2005, Officer Jamie Boots was dispatched to 3204 
Lincoln Avenue on a complaint of a fight. Officers Draper and Eggerman 
were likewise dispatched to the area. 
2. Upon arrival, the Officers did not initially observe any individuals in the 
area. 
3. Officer Boots heard a noise he later associated to be the Defendant 
stumbling in the back parking lot of the address in question and observed the 
Defendant walking toward 32nd street with his hands in his pockets, 
4. Officers approached the Defendant and asked him if he had any knowledge 
of the fight or saw anything. 
5. Officers observed that the Defendant had both hands inside the front pocket 
of his sweatshirt. 
6. The defendant replied that he "didn't do shit." 
7. Officer Boots believed that the defendant was intoxicated due to the 
Defendant's glassy eyes, slurred speech, unsteadiness on his feet, and the 
strong smell of alcohol coming from his person. 
• 4 V . ' 
8. Officer Boots observed the Defendant's hand fumbling with something in 
his sweatshirt pocket. 
9. Officer Boots asked the Defendant if he wouldn't mind taking his hands out 
of his pockets. 
10. The Defendant removed only his left hand to show he had nothing, but 
would not remove his right hand. 
11. Due to officer safety concerns, Officer Boots repeatedly requested that the 
Defendant remove his hands from his pockets. During these requests, the 
Defendant continued to fidget with something in his pocket. 
12. Officer Boots then stated to the Defendant that he was no longer asking the 
Defendant to take his hands out of his pockets, but was telling him to. 
13. At this time the Defendant turned away from the officers and began to walk 
away. 
14. Officer Boots told the Defendant to stop and again take his hands out of his 
pockets. 
15. The Defendant had only gone a few feet when, Officer Boots reached out 
and grabbed the left arm of the Defendant. 
16. Because the Defendant physically resisted Officer Boot's effort to remove 
his right hand from this pocket, Officer Boots placed the Defendant in a 
twist lock and took the Defendant to the ground. 
17. Officer Boots continued to try and get the Defendant's right hand out of his 
pocket and behind his back. 
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18. Officer Eggerman also assisted Officer Boots in trying to remove the 
Defendant's hand from his pocket. During this time the Defendant 
continued to struggle against the officers. 
19. Officer Boots then exerted two closed fist punches to the small of the 
Defendant's back in an attempt to gain control. 
20. Officers Boots, Draper and Eggerman finally gained control of the 
Defendant's right hand and placed it behind his back, placing handcuffs on 
the Defendant. 
21. While placing the Defendant's hands in cuffs, Officer Boots noticed a clear 
plastic baggie containing a white rock substance gripped in the Defendant's 
right hand. 
22. At no time during the incident, did Officer Boots, or any other officer 
present, inform the Defendant he was under arrest for public intoxication or 
for interfering with arrest. 
Based on these findings the trial court concluded that: 
1. Officer Boots had reasonable articulable suspicion to perform a weapons 
frisk on the Defendant for officer safety. 
2. Officer Boots did not have probable cause to escalate the weapons frisk to 
search for weapons. 
3. Officer Boots went beyond the scope of a weapons frisk and proceeded to 
an arrest without ever informing the Defendant he was under arrest. 
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4. The Fourth Amendment requires an officer to inform an individual that they 
are under arrest. Because Officer Boots did not inform the Defendant that 
he was under arrest, Officer Boots violated the Defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
5. Because Officer Boots went beyond the scope of a weapons frisk and failed 
to inform the Defendant that he was under arrest, the subsequent discovery 
of contraband is fruit of the poisonous tree and is hereby suppressed. 
(R. 070-071). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point L Although the State is correct that the Fourth Amendment does not require 
a police officer to inform an arrestee of the charges, or that they are under arrest, Utah law 
does require the person making the arrest to notify the arrestee of his intention, cause, and 
authority to arrest the arrestee. 
Point II. The Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
searches was violated repeatedly during his encounter with Officer Boots. The first 
violation occurred when Officer Boots detained the Defendant without sufficient facts that 
would suggest the Defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Officer Boots did not have 
probable cause to arrest the Defendant for Intoxication. Defendant's rights were further 
violated when Officer Boots took the Defendant to the ground, handcuffed him and 
proceeded to wrestle his arm from his pocket. The frisk of the Defendant exceeded the 
scope of what is allowed by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Since 
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Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the evidence that was discovered was 
correctly suppressed by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHILE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE POLICE TO 
INFORM AN ARRESTEE THAT HE IS UNDER ARREST BEFORE TAKING 
HIM INTO CUSTODY, UTAH CODE ANN. §77-7-6 REQUIRES THE 
OFFICER TO INFORM THE ARRESTEE. 
Defendant concedes with the State's assessment that the Fourth Amendment does not 
require the police to notify arrestees of charges, let alone that they are under arrest. 
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 125 S.Ct.588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004). 
Moreover, Defendant would stipulate to the facts and the holding of Devenpeck, as presented 
by the State for its assertion that the Fourth Amendment does not require that the Defendant 
be informed of the reasons for his arrest, and that an arrest is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment so long as it is made with probable cause. 
The Supreme Court stated in Devenpeck that "While it is assuredly good police 
practice to inform a person of the reason for his arrest at the time he is taken into custody, 
we have never held that to be a constitutionally required." Id. at 155. While it may not be 
constitutionally required under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to 
inform a defendant of the reasons for his arrest, Utah law is clear that an officer shall inform 
the defendant of the reasons for his arrest. This duty is imposed by Utah Code Ann. §77-7-
6(1). Section 77-7-6(1) requires an officer making an arrest to inform the person being 
arrested of his intention, cause, and authority to arrest him. This notice is not required when 
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the notice will endanger the life or safety of the officer, the arrestee is engaged in the 
commission of, or the attempt to commit an offense, or the arrestee is pursued immediately 
after the commission of an offense or escape. 
None of the elements, allowing Officer Boots to arrest the Defendant without 
informing him he was under arrest, arise in this case. It was not dangerous to inform the 
Defendant he was under arrest. The only time the Defendant struggled with the officers was 
when he was taken to the ground after trying to walk away from the situation. There is 
simply no evidence that the Defendant engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to 
commit, an offense. Finally, the Defendant was not pursued after the commission of an 
offense or an escape. While the trial court may have ruled incoiTectly that "the Fourth 
Amendment requires an officer to inform an individual that they are under arrest" (R. 071), 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-6(1) requires an officer to inform an individual he is under arrest. 
POINT II 
POLICE DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE 
THE DEFENDANT WAS INTOXICATED 
Under Devenpeck, an arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so long as 
it is made with probable cause. Id. at 152. The trial court ruled that the police lacked 
probable cause to search the Defendant. (R. 070-071). The trial court correctly made this 
ruling base on its factual findings, and should be allowed to stand. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as Article 
1 Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provide in relevant part: 'The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
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searches and seizures shall not be violated." The Courts on both the state and federal level 
have defined when a seizure is unreasonable. 
In State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002) the Utah Supreme Court defined 
its long-standing position on permissible levels of seizures. In Hansen, the Court defined 
these levels as follows: 
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a consensual 
encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning by an 
officer. Since the encounter is consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, 
there is no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
A level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is usually 
characterized as brief and non-intrusive. Although it is a Fourth Amendment seizure, 
probable cause is not required. Rather, when "specific and articulable facts and 
rational inferences . . . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is 
committing a crime," an officer may initiate an investigative detention without 
consent. 
A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been "characterized [as a] 
highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] requires probable cause." A level three 
encounter is also a Fourth Amendment seizure. Id (citations and quotations omitted). 
The Defendant's encounter with the police officers quickly escalated to a level three 
encounter once the officers decided to arrest the Defendant. The search incident to arrest was a 
continuation of that level three encounter. Under both federal and state constitutional law, the police 
must have "probable cause" that an offense occurred. The United States Supreme Court has defined 
probable cause justifying an arrest as "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that 
are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the 
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an 
offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). In the present case there was no offense, 
and therefore no probable cause. 
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Defendant was being arrested for intoxication. The trial court's factual findings (R. 069) 
indicate that the Defendant's eyes were glassy, his speech was slurred, there was a strong smell of 
alcohol coming from the Defendant and he had a hard time keeping his balance. There is a 
difference between being intoxicated and being guilty of the crime of intoxication. It is not against 
the law for a citizen to drink alcohol and become "drunk" or intoxicated. The criminal offense of 
intoxication is found in section 76-9-701. Subsection one reads: 
A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of alcohol, a 
controlled substance, or any substance . . . to a degree that the person may 
endanger himself or another, in a public place or in a private place where he 
unreasonably disturbs other persons. U.C.A. §76-9-701(2004). 
In State v. Tram, 57 P.3d 1052 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court addressed a factual 
situation that was somewhat similar to the one in the case at bar. There are some important 
distinctions however. In Trane, Salt Lake City police officers were notified that a man was harassing 
customers at a convenience store. When an officer arrived the defendant was standing by some 
public telephones. A store clerk pointed at the defendant indicating that he was the focus of the 
complaint. Id. at 1054-55. As the officer approached the defendant he smelled alcohol on his person 
and breath. The officer also observed the defendant being loud; behaving in a "tumultuous-type 
manner"; using profanity and the defendant was using his hands to express himself. The defendant 
also "puffed his chest out [and] took a defensive posture similar to a boxer". Id. at 1055. When the 
officer asked for the defendant's identification, he refused to comply. The defendant was eventually 
arrested for intoxication and resisting arrest. When he was searched incident to arrest, cocaine was 
found on his person. Id. 
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On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the defendant challenged his arrest for intoxication. 
The Supreme Court found that it was a valid arrest. Of importance to this case is the Court's listing 
of the elements of public intoxication. The Court held that a "person commits the crime of public 
intoxication under the Utah Code when that person 'is under the influence of alcohol... to a degree 
that the person may endanger himself or another, in a public place... where he unreasonably disturbs 
other persons.'" Id. at 1062 (quoting, U.C.A. § 76-9-701(l)(1999)). 
One of the elements of intoxication is that the person "unreasonably disturbs other persons." 
In Trane, the defendant was "loud" and behaving in a "tumultuous-type" of manner. Id. at 1062. He 
was also harassing the convenience store clerk. In the case at bar, the Defendant was minding his 
own business when he was approached by the officers. (R. 068). After he told them he hadn't done 
anything he attempted to leave. (R. 069). It was as he was walking away that an officer physically 
grabbed his arm, put it in a twist lock and then took him to the ground. The Defendant hadn't 
unreasonably disturbed anyone. Moreover, there is no showing that the Defendant may have 
endangered himself or another. There is no record that, as the State contends, Officer Boots was 
"reasonabley concerned that defendant may stumble into oncoming traffic." See, Plaintiff/Appellant's 
Brief of Appellant, p. 14. There is likewise no record that Officer Boots was concerned the 
Defendant might become "entangled in a fight or other crime." Id. For these reasons there was no 
probable cause to support the arrest of the Defendant. 
Once this Court has established that there was a constitutionally impermissible seizure of the 
Defendant, the next issue is to what extent does this constitutional violation affect the evidence that 
was found during the search incident to arrest. In the case of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
12 
471,485 (1963) the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "[t]he exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from 
trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion." 
The Utah Courts have likewise followed the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. In State v. 
Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) this Court held: 
Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule, Mapp requires us to exclude 'all 
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution.' Mapp, 
367 U.S. at 655, 81 S.Ct. at 1691. There is no dispute that the stop of defendant at the 
Tibbie Fork Canyon traffic checkpoint was unconstitutional. Nor is there any dispute 
that, absent the good faith exception, all evidence obtained subsequent to defendant's 
stop should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U. S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 
If the Defendant didn't commit an offense, then the officers had no legal basis to justify a 
warrantless search and the exclusionary rule would apply. In State v. Hechtle, 89 P.3d 185 (Utah C. 
App. 2004), the Court of Appeals stated, '[a]n officer must have probable cause . . . to believe that 
the suspect has committed or is committing an offense." Id. at 188 (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
Probable cause determinations are reviewed under an "objective standard: whether from the 
facts known to the officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly... be drawn therefrom, a reasonable 
and prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified in believing that the suspect had 
committed the offense for which he was arrested." Id. at 189(alterations in original)(citations and 
quotations omitted). As previously stated, it is not against the law for a person to be intoxicated. 
A person has to also unreasonably disturb others. There was no indication that the Defendant had 
disturbed anyone. For these reasons the officers were not justified in believing that the Defendant 
had committed the offense of intoxication. 
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Since the Defendant didn't violate the law, the officers did not have probable cause to arrest 
him. The contraband, which was found during the subsequent search incident to arrest, should be 
suppressed by the trial court. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
suppress the evidence that was found during said search. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above arguments, the trial court's ruling suppressing the cocaine evidence 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this/_Z day of October, 2006. 
RYANT. BUSHELL 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
BERNARD L. ALLEN #0039 of 
Box Elder County Public Defender's Association 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2550 Washington Boulevard, Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801)399-4191 
,n:uH0UlS1RiCl CUUR1 
TJmM 12 P 2-02 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
JAN 1 2 2005 
Case No. .051905998 
Judge W. Brent West 
COMES NOW, the Defendant above-named, by and through his attorney, 
Bernard L. Allen, and hereby moves this Court to suppress the evidence obtained in this 
matter. This Motion is based upon the Fourth Amendment the United States Constitution 
and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution and is supported by the 
attached memorandum. 
DATED t h i s / / ? day of January 2006. 
L. ALLEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Motion to Suppress to: 
2380 Washington Blvd., 2nd Floor 
Weber County Attorney 
t n; 
Ogden,UT 84401 
postage prepaid, on this ^ _ day of January 2006 
Secretary 
L-CtOHD DISTRICJ CUUKT 
BERNARD L. ALLEN #0039 of 
Weber County Public Defender's Association 26flb JAN 1? D ?*• 03 
Attorney for Defendant 
2550 Washington Boulevard, Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
m THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH J AH 1 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON, , ] 
Defendant. ] 
> MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
) Case No. .051905998 
Judge W. Brent West 
COMES NOW, the Defendant above-named, by and through his attorney, Bernard L. 
Allen and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Suppress. 
FACTS 
The Defendant has been charged by Information with possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute, a first degree felony, interference with arresting officer, 
a class B misdemeanor, and Intoxication a class C misdemeanor. The facts that led to the 
Defendant's arrest and subsequent search are in dispute. However, according to Officer 
Derek Draper and Officer Jamie Boots of the Ogden Police Department a complainant called 
and stated several people were fighting in front of Jessie's Barber Shop at 3204 Lincoln 
Avenue. 
When the officers arrived they didn't fmd anyone in front of the barbershop. They did 
fmd the Defendant in the back parldng lot of the barbershop. According to Officer Boots, the 
Defendant was "stumbling around" in the back parking lot. No apparent injuries were 
observed nor was there any other indication that Defendant had been involved in a physical 
confrontation. Officer Boots approached the Defendant and asked him if he had any 
knowledge of the disturbance. Defendant's allegedly answered "Man, I didn't do shit." 
Officers Boots and Draper indicated that they could smell a strong odor of alcohol on 
Defendant's breath. Officer Boots indicated in his report that Defendant's eyes were 
bloodshot, his speech was slurred and he was having a hard time keeping his balance. 
Defendant was ordered to take his hands out of his pockets so he could be arrested for 
public intoxication. The Defendant turned and began to walk away. Officer Boots grabbed 
the Defendant's left arm and placed it in a twist lock. The Defendant allegedly tried to turn 
and pull away from Officer Boots grasp. 
The Defendant was taken to the ground and laid on his stomach. The Defendant 
allegedly put his right hand under his stomach. Officer Boots punched Defendant in the back 
twice. Officer Draper kneed the Defendant twice in his thigh. 
The Defendant was eventually handcuffed. Following his arrest he was searched and 
a plastic baggie containing a substance that tested positive for cocaine was found in his 
possession. 
The officers did not ask the Defendant to perform field sobriety tests or to submit to a 
Breathalyzer to determine Ms blood alcohol level or his level of intoxication. 
ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as Article 1 
Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provide in relevant part: "The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT... 
State v Henderson 
and seizures shall not be violated." The Courts on both the state and federal level have defined 
when a seizure is unreasonable. 
In State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002) the Utah Supreme Court defined its 
long-standing position on permissible levels of seizures. In Hansen, the Court defined these 
levels as follows: 
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a consensual 
encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning 
by an officer. Since the encounter is consensual, and the person is free to leave 
at any point, there is no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
A level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is usually 
characterized as brief and non-intrusive. Although it is a Fourth Amendment 
seizure, probable cause is not required. Rather, when "specific and articulable 
facts and rational inferences . . . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person 
has or is committing a crime," an officer may initiate an investigative detention 
without consent. 
A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been "characterized [as 
a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] requires probable cause." A 
level three encounter is also a Fourth Amendment seizure. Id. (citations and 
quotations omitted). 
The Defendant's encounter with the police officers quickly escalated to a level three 
encounter once the officers decided to arrest the Defendant. The search incident to arrest was 
a continuation of that level three encounter. Under both federal and state constitutional law, 
the police must have "probable cause" that an offense occurred. The United States Supreme 
Court has defined probable cause justifying an arrest as "facts and circumstances within the 
officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable 
caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit an offense," Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 
(1979). In the present case there was no offense, and therefore no probable cause. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT... 
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Defendant was being arrested for intoxication. The facts articulated in the police 
report indicate that Defendant's eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred and he had a 
hard time keeping his balance. There is a difference between being intoxicated and being 
guilty of the crime of intoxication. It is not against the law for a citizen to drink alcohol and 
become "drunk" or intoxicated. The criminal offense of intoxication is found in section 76-9-
701. Subsection one reads: 
A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of alcohol, a 
controlled substance, or any substance . . . to a degree that the person may 
endanger himself or another, in a public place or in a private place where 
he unreasonably disturbs other persons. U.C.A. §76-9-701(2004). 
In State v. Trane, 57 P.3d 1052 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court addressed a 
factual situation that was somewhat similar to the one in the case at bar. There are some 
important distinctions however. In Trane, Salt Lake City police officers were notified that a 
man was harassing customers at a convenience store. When an officer arrived the defendant 
was standing by some public telephones. A store clerk pointed at the defendant indicating 
that he was the focus of the complamt. Id. at 1054-55. As the officer approached the 
defendant he smelled alcohol on his person and breath. The officer also observed the 
defendant being loud; behaving in a "tumultuous-type manner"; using profanity and the 
defendant was using his hands to express himself. The defendant also "puffed his chest out 
[and] took a defensive posture similar to a boxer". Id. at 1055. When the officer asked for the 
defendant's identification, he refused to comply. The defendant was eventually arrested for 
intoxication and resisting arrest. When he was searched incident to arrest, cocaine was found 
on his person. Id. 
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On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the defendant challenged his arrest for 
intoxication. The Supreme Court found that it was a valid arrest. Of importance to this case is 
the Court's listing of the elements of public intoxication. The Court held that a "person 
commits the crime of public intoxication under the Utah Code when that person 'is under the 
influence of alcohol . . . to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, in a 
public place . . . where he unreasonably disturbs other persons.'" Id. at 1062 (quoting, U.C.A. 
§76-9-701(l)(1999)). 
One of the elements of intoxication is that the person "unreasonably disturbs other 
persons." In Trane, the defendant was "loud" and behaving in a "tumultuous-type" of manner. 
Id. at 1062. He was also harassing the convenience store cleric In the case at bar, the 
Defendant was minding his own business when he was approached by the officers. After he 
told them he hadn't done anything he attempted to leave. It was as he was walking away that 
an officer physically grabbed his arm, put it in a twist lock and then took him to the ground. 
The Defendant hadn't unreasonably disturbed anyone. For these reasons there was no 
probable cause to support the arrest of the Defendant. 
Once this Court has established that there was a constitutionally impermissible seizure 
of the Defendant, the next issue is to what extent does this constitutional violation affect the 
evidence that was found during the search incident to arrest. In the case of Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) the U.S. Supreme Court stated, cc[t]he exclusionary 
rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as 
a direct result of an unlawful invasion." 
The Utah Courts have likewise followed the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. In 
State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) this Court held: 
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Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule, Mapp requires us to exclude 'all 
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution.' 
Mapp 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S.Ct at 1691. There is no dispute that the stop of 
defendant at the Tibbie Fork Canyon traffic checkpoint was unconstitutional. 
Nor is there any dispute that, absent the good faith exception, all evidence 
obtained subsequent to defendant's stop should be suppressed as "fruit of the 
poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 
407,417,9L.Ed.2d441(1963). 
If the Defendant didn't commit an offense, then the officers had no legal basis to 
justify a warrantless search and the exclusionary rule would apply. In State v. Hechtle, 89 
P.3d 185 (Utah C. App. 2004), the Court of Appeals stated, '[a]n officer must have probable 
cause . . . to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense." Id at 188 
(citations and quotations omitted). 
Probable cause determinations are reviewed under an "objective standard: whether 
from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly . . . be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified in 
believing that the suspect had committed the offense for which he was arrested." Id. at 
189(alterations in original)(citations and quotations omitted). As has been previously stated, 
it is not against the law for a person to be intoxicated. A person has to also unreasonably 
disturb others. There was no indication that the Defendant had disturbed anyone. For these 
reasons the officers were not justified in believing that the Defendant had committed the 
offense of intoxication. 
Since the Defendant didn't violate the law, the officers did not have probable cause to 
arrest him. The contraband, which was found during the subsequent search incident to arrest, 
should be suppressed by the trial court. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests 
this Court to suppress the evidence that was found during said search. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant was arrested for an offense which requires him to unreasonably disturb 
other people. The Defendant was minding his own business when the officers encountered 
him and decided to arrest him for intoxication. Since the officers did not have probable cause 
to effectuate the arrest, the evidence which was discovered during the search incident to arrest 
should be suppressed. 
DATED this / J day of January 2006 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress to: 
Weber County Attorney 
2380 Washington Blvd., 2nd Floor 
Ogden,UT 84401 
postage prepaid this JO day of January 2006 
let M. Ryan 
Legal Secretary 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 051905998 
Judge W. Brent West 
COMES NOW, Nathan D. Lyon5 Deputy Weber County Attorney, and respectfully 
submits this Memorandum of Law to support the State's Objection to Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. 
FACTS 
On November 27, 2005 at approximately 1.54 a.m., Officer Jamie Boots was dispatched 
to the aiea of 3204 Lincoln Avenue on the complaint of fighting in front of Jessie's Barbershop. 
Ogden Police Officeis Boots, Draper, and Eggerman lesponded to the scene. 
Upon arrival, the Officers did not observe any individuals in the aiea. However, their 
attention was attracted to back paiking lot of the barbershop when they saw and heaid an 
individual stumbling up against vehicles parked in the parking lot. It was at that time that Officer 
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Boots observed an individual who, because he was unable to maintain his balance as he wallced, 
was banging up against vehicles. This caused Officer Boots concern as this individual appeared 
to be very intoxicated and was headed toward the busy road of 32nd Street. 
Officer Boots approached the individual and asked him if he had seen any fighting in the 
area. The individual, who was later identified as Michael Henderson (Defendant), turned and 
replied, "Man, I didn't do shit." At this time Officer Boots could smell a very strong odor of 
alcohol coming from the Defendant. Additionally, the Defendant's eyes appeared bloodshot, his 
speech was slurred, and the Defendant was having difficulty maintaining his balance. At this 
time, the Defendant had his hands in his coat pockets. Officer Boots permissively asked the 
Defendant if he would mind taking his hands out of his pockets. The Defendant refused this 
request and continued to fumble with something in his pocket. Fearing that the Defendant might 
have a weapon, Officer Boots then ordered the Defendant to remove his hands from his pockets. 
The Defendant refused this order, and turned and started to walk away. 
Officer Boots immediately ordered the Defendant to stop and place his hands behind his 
back, though he doesn't remember whether he verbally articulated to the Defendant was he was 
under arrest. The Defendant, with his right hand still fidgeting with something in his pocket, 
refused this command and took a step away from the Officers. Officer Boots ordered the 
Defendant to stop and take his hands out of his pockets. The Defendant again refused Ihis order. 
Fearing that the Defendant might have a weapon, Officer Boots grabbed the Defendant and 
placed the Defendant's left ami in a twist lock. The Defendant tried to turn and pull away from 
Officer Boots's grasp, hi this struggle, the Defendant was taken to the ground. Officer Boots 
continued to order the Defendant to lemove his hands from his pockets, and Officer Eggerman 
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was unable to physically remove the Defendant's hands from his coat pockets. During this 
struggle, Officer Boots struck the Defendant twice in the back. At this same time, Officer Draper 
was also assisting Officer Boots try to remove the Defendant's hands from his coat pockets. 
Officer Draper also delivered several blows with his knee to the Defendant's thigh in effort to 
remove his hands from his pockets. Officers Eggerman and Boots were finally able to gain 
control of the Defendant's hands and place them into handcuffs. While placing the Defendant's 
hands into the cuffs, Officer Boots saw in the Defendant's right hand a plastic baggy containing a 
substantial amount of white ivory rick like substance. 
The Defendant was brought to his feet and asked if he needed medical attention. The 
Defendant replied, "Fuck you." Because there were no visible signs of physical injury, no 
medical was requested. Officer Boots read the Defendant his Miranda rights and asked if he 
would talk with him about the situation. The Defendant replied, 'Tuck you, I want my lawyer 
right now!" 
The white substance flashed positive for cocaine and the Defendant was transported to the 
Weber County Jail. While waiting to be booked at the jail, the Defendant fell of the bench due to 
his intoxication. 
DISCUSSION 
The Defense asserts that Officer Boots lacked probable cause to effectuate an arrest for 
public intoxication under Utah Code Ann. §76-9-701(1) because the Defendant was not 
unreasonably disturbing anyone. Rather, he was simply drunk and minding his own business. 
The State asserts that the Defendant's interpretation of §76-9-701(1) is too limiting. A 
careful reading of the statute shows that unreasonably disturbing others is only one way in wlrich 
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a person may violate §76-9-701(1). One of the other ways occurred in this case. Specifically, 
Officer Boots observed the Defendant in a public place in an extremely intoxicated state where it 
appeared that he was a danger either to himself or the public. Based on these observations, 
Officer Boots had probable cause to arrest the Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
OFFICER BOOTS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST THE 
DEFENDANT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has outlined the three types of citizen encounters with law 
enforcement officials: 
A level one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a 
consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to a 
non-coercive questioning by an officer. Since the encounter is 
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is not 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
A level two encounter involves an investigative detention that is 
usually characterized as a brief and non-intrusive. Although it is a 
Fourth Amendment seizure, probable cause is not required. Rather, 
when specific and articulable facts and rational inferences give rise 
to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime, an 
officer may initiate an investigative detention without consent. 
A level three encounter involves an arrest, which has been 
characterized as a highly intrusive or lengthy detention that 
requires probable cause. A level three encounter is also a Fourth 
Amendment seizure. 
State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002) (Internal quotations and citations omitted) 
(Emphasis added). 
Officer Boots's initial contact with the Defendant was a level one encounter. Officer 
Boots had been dispatched to investigate a fight at Jesses's Barbershop. Mien he approached the 
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Defendant, he pennissively asked whether the Defendant had seen any fighting. The Defendant 
was under no obligation to speak with Officer Boots and was free to leave. However, the 
Defendant voluntarily spoke with Officer Boots. 
After speaking with the Defendant, Officer Boots had probable cause to escalate the 
encounter to a level three stop. Because a level three encounter must be supported by probable 
cause, Officer Boots's stop would be justified as a level three stop if he had probable cause. The 
Utah Supreme Court explained that the determination of whether the police have probable cause 
to arrest without a warrant "should be made on an objective standard: whether from the facts 
known to the officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and 
prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified in believing that the suspect had 
committed the offense." State v. Cole, 61A P.2d 119,125 (Utah 1983) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
hi this case, Officer Boots believed that the Defendant had committed the offense of 
public intoxication: 
A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of 
alcohol, a controlled substance, or any substance having the 
property of releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the person may 
endanger himself or another, in a public place or in a private place 
where he unreasonably disturbs other persons. 
Utah Code Ann, §76-9-701(1). 
Therefore, Officer Boots had probable cause to arrest the Defendant if a reasonably 
prudent person making the same observations as Officer Boots would have believed that the 
Defendant was intoxicated to the level that he posed a threat of danger to himself or the public 
while being in a public place. The relevant question then becomes what did Officer Boots 
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observe and were those infeiences he made reasonable under the circumstances. 
The fair and reasonable inferences drawn from Officer Boots's observations would justify 
a leasonably prudent person to believe that the Defendant posed a threat of danger to himself or 
the public while he was in a public place. After asking the Defendant if he had seen any fighting, 
the Defendant responded, "I didn't do shit". At this time Officer Boots observed that the 
Defendant's speech was slurred, his eyes were bloodshot, his sense of balance was compromised, 
and he had a very strong odor of alcohol coming from him. Additionally, Officer Boots's initial 
observation of the Defendant was that of the Defendant banging up against cars because he could 
not maintain his balance. Before Officer Boots made contact with him, the Defendant was 
attempting to walk toward 32nd street, which is a busy road. The Defendant, presumably trying to 
walk home, notwithstanding his inability to even properly walk, coupled with his poor sense of 
balance when stopped, his blood shoot eyes, slurred speech, and the strong odor of alcohol 
coming from the defendant certainly would justify a reasonably prudent person to conclude that 
the Defendant in his then present state posed a threat to himself or the public. 
Because Officer Boots had probable cause to justify stopping the Defendant, the 
subsequent discovery of contraband was properly discovered. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State requests the Court deny Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. 
Dated the (j day of February, 2006. 
Nathan D. Lyon 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered on this day of February, 2006, a copy of the 
foregoing STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS to: 
Bernard Allen 
2550 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION 
Case No. 051905998 
Judge W. Brent West 
COMES NOW, Nathan D. Lyon, Deputy Weber County Attorney, and objects to 
the Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and requests this Court 
clarify its mling. Specifically, this Court in its oral ruling initially stated that the Officers had 
probable cause to arrest the Defendant, but never told the Defendant that he was under arrest, 
thus failing to use the "magic words", hi elaborating its ruling, the Court later stated thai the 
Officers lacked probable cause to arrest the Defendant. For purposes of maintaining the record, 
the State respectfully requests this Court to clarify its mling. 
Dated the H£_ day of March, 2006. 
Nathan D.Lyon ( \ 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
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ADDENDUM D 
Ryan J. Busliell, #8843 
Attorney for Defendant 
The Law Office of Ryan J. Bush ell, P.C. 
298 24th Street, Suite 230 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 612-9505 
Facsimile: (801) 612-9565 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 051905998 
Judge W. Brent West 
This matter came on for a suppression hearing on February 8, 2006 on this Court's 
regular law and motion calendar. The Court, having heard the arguments and testimony, and 
having read the briefs of the parties, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 27, 2005, Officer Jamie Boots was dispatched to 3204 Lincoln Avenue on 
a complaint of a flight. Officeis Draper and Eggerman weie also dispatched to the area. 
2. Upon arrival, the officers did not initially see any individuals in the area. 
3. Officer Boots heard a noise he later associated to be the Defendant stumbling in the back 
parking lot of the addiess in question and observed that the Defendant was walking 
toward 32nd sheet with Iris hands in his pockets. 
1 
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Officers approached the Defendant and observed that he had both hands inside the front 
pockets of Iris sweatshirt. 
Officers asked him if he had any knowledge of a fight in the area. 
The Defendant replied that he "didn't do shit.11 
Officer Boots believed that the Defendant was intoxicated due to the Defendant's glassy 
eyes, slurred speech, unsteadiness on his feet, and the strong smell of alcohol coming 
from his person. 
Officer Boots observed the Defendant's right hand was fumbling with something in the 
pocket. 
Officer Boots asked the defendant if he wouldn't mind talcing his hands out of his 
pockets. 
The Defendant removed his left hand only to show he had nothing in his hand, but he 
never removed his right hand. 
Due to officer safety concerns, Officer Boots repeatedly requested that the Defendant 
remove his hands from his pockets. During these repeated requests, the Defendant 
continued to fidget with something in his right pocket. 
Officer Boots then stated to the Defendant that he was no longer asking the Defendant to 
take his hands out of his pockets, but was telling him to do so. 
At this time the Defendant turned away from the Officers and began to walk away. 
Officer Boots told the Defendant to stop and again told him to take his hands out of his 
pockets. 
The Defendant had only gone a few feet when Officer Boots was able to grab the 
2 
Defendant by his left ami. 
16. Because the Defendant physically resisted Officer Boots's efforts to remove his right 
hand from his pocket, Officer Boots put the Defendant in a twist lock and took the 
Defendant to the ground. 
17. Officer Boots continued to try to get the Defendant's right hand out of his pocket and 
behind his back. 
18. Officer Eggennan and Draper also assisted Officer Boots in trying to remove the 
Defendant's hand from his pocket. Durmg this time the Defendant continued to struggle 
against the officers. 
19. Officer Boots then exerted two closed fist punches to the small of the Defendant's back in 
an attempt to gain control of the Defendant. 
20. Officers Boots, Draper, and Eggennan finally gained control over the Defendant's right 
hand and place it behind his back, placing the Defendant in handcuffs. 
21. While placing the Defendant's hands in cuffs, Officer Boots noticed a clear plastic baggie 
. containing a white rock substance gripped in the defendant's right hand. 
22. At no time during the incident did Officer Boots or any other officer present infonn the 
Defendant he was under an est for public intoxication or for interfering with arrest. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Officer Boots had leasonable articulable suspicion to perform a weapons frisk on the 
Defendant for officer safety. 
2. Officer Boots did not have probable cause to escalate the weapons frisk to search for 
3 
weapons. 
Officer Boots went beyond the scope of a weapons frisk and proceeded to an arrest 
without ever informing the Defendant that he was under arrest. 
The Fourth Amendment requires an officer to inform an individual that they are under 
arrest. Because Officer Boots did not inform the Defendant that he was under arrest, 
Officer Boots violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 
Because Officer Boots went beyond the scope of a weapons frisk and failed to inform the 
Defendant that he was under arrest, the subsequent discovery of contraband is fruit of the 
poisonous tree and is hereby suppressed. 
Dated the <5~" day of May, 2006. 
W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form 
Nathan D. Lyon 
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1 QGDEN, UTAH FEBRUARY 8, 2 00 6 
2 THE COURT: WHICH MATTER DO WE HAVE HERE? 
3 MR. ALLEN: THIS IS MICHAEL HENDERSON, YOUR HONOR. 
4 I THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I WAS TOLD THIS ONE WAS GOING. 
MR. ALLEN: WHAT? 
THE COURT: IS THIS ONE GOING? 
MR. ALLEN: YEAH, IT'S A LITTLE HEARING. 
THE COURT: OH, ALL RIGHT. 
MR. ALLEN: A SUPPRESSION HEARING. 
101 MR. BUSHELL: JUDGE, REALLY QUICKLY ON THIS MATTER, 
11 COURT MIGHT RECALL, I ENTERED MY APPEARANCE PRIVATELY ON THIS 
12 CASE AFTER MR. ALLEN HAD SET THIS DATE AND PREPARED HIS 
13 MOTION SO — 
14 THE COURT: RIGHT. 
15 MR. BUSHELL: — WE'RE GONNA TAG TEAM IT TODAY, AND 
16 AFTER TODAY, I'LL BE HANDLING THE MATTER. 
17 THE COURT: IT'S A LITTLE UNFAIR TO MR. LYON TO HAVE 
18 BOTH OF YOU BEAT UP ON HIM. 
19 MR. ALLEN: WELL, IT MIGHT BE, YOUR HONOR. MIGHT BE. 
20 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR 
21 HEARING. IS THE STATE READY? 
22 MR. LYON: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
23 THE COURT: ANY OPENING STATEMENT? 
24 MR. LYON: NO. 
















DO I START? 
YES. 
YOU HAVE THE MEMORANDUM? 
I DO. 
I ASSUME YOU GOT MR. LYON'S? 
I DID. 
OKAY. WE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO GO THROUGH 





TO THE POLICE ON THE CASE. SPOKE TO THE --
THAT. INDICATED WE WAIVED THE PRELIM BACK ON 
THE 7TH OF DECEMBER. IN GOING THROUGH THE INFORMATION IN 
THIS CASE, YOUR HONOR, THERE'S — THERE'S SOME THINGS THAT 
ARE VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU NEED TO KNOW. THE OPENING 
ARGUMENT IN THIS CASE IS THAT THE -- -THIS IS AN ARREST WITH 
NO PROBABLE CAUSE WHATSOEVER. THE OFFICERS WERE CALLED TO A 
SPECIFIC THING INVOLVING A -- SUPPOSEDLY A FIGHT OUT IN FRONT 
OF THIS BARBERSHOP. THE OFFICERS ARRIVED. I DON'T KNOW HOW 
MUCH LONGER, HOW LATE FROM WHEN THE ACTUAL INITIAL CALL TOOK 
PLACE, BUT BY THE TIME THEY GOT THERE, THERE WAS NOTHING 
HAPPENING. THERE WAS NO FIGHT, THERE WAS NO PEOPLE MILLING 
AROUND, THERE WAS NOTHING HAPPENING. THE OFFICERS, RATHER 
THAN GOING INSIDE THE BARBERSHOP AND TALKING TO ANYBODY, 
APPARENTLY WALKED AROUND TO THE BACK OF THE BARBERSHOP. AND 
IN THE BACK OF THE BARBERSHOP, THEY INDICATED THEY SAW 
MR. HENDERSON. HE WAS BY HIMSELF. HE WAS NOT CAUSING A 
5 
1 DISTURBANCE. HE WAS NOT DOING ANYTHING THAT RESULTED IN THE 
2 POLICE OFFICERS BEING CALLED. THE OFFICER ASKED HIM IF HE 
3 KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT HAD BEEN GOING ON WITH THE FIGHT. 
4 AND THE OFFICER — AND THE DEFENDANT RESPONDED APPROPRIATELY, 
5 I DIDN'T DO ANYTHING, AND TURNED TO WALK AWAY. THE OFFICER 
6 HAD NO PROBABLE CAUSE WHATSOEVER OR EVEN A REASONABLE 
7| SUSPICION THAT MR. HENDERSON WAS INVOLVED IN ANYTHING OR 
ANY -- ANYTHING ABOUT WHY HE WAS CALLED. AND YET HE AND 
OFFICER DRAPER DEMANDED THAT HE TAKE HIS HANDS OUT OF HIS 
101 POCKETS. WELL, HE'S WALKING AWAY FROM THEM. AND THEY STATE 
11 VERY CLEARLY IN THEIR POLICE REPORT THAT HE WAS NOT ONLY 
12 WALKING AWAY FROM THEM, BUT WAS GAINING GROUND FROM THEM. SO 
13 HE CLEARLY WAS NOT CAUSING ANY KIND OF THREAT TO THEM. HE 
14 WAS A THREAT OF NOTHING TO THE POLICE OFFICERS. HE HADN'T 
15 DONE ANYTHING. HE HADN'T DONE ANYTHING THAT HAD RESULTED IN 
16 THEIR BEING CALLED. THEY CLAIM THAT HE WAS STUMBLING, THEY 
17 SAY, ALTHOUGH — AND THEIR CLAIM IS THAT THEY WERE TALKING TO 
18 HIM ABOUT PUBLIC INTOXICATION. BUT THERE IS NOTHING THAT HE 
19 WAS DOING THAT LOOKED LIKE HE WAS ENDANGERING HIMSELF OR 
20 CAUSING A DISTURBANCE WHICH WOULD ALLOW THEM TO CONSIDER 
21 PUBLIC INTOXICATION IN THIS CASE. AND WHEN HE INDICATED HE 
22 DIDN'T WANNA SPEAK TO THEM, AND APPROPRIATELY WALKED AWAY, HE 
23 DIDN'T RUN, HE DIDN'T DIVE INTO THE, YOU KNOW, BETWEEN CARS, 
24 HE DIDN'T ATTEMPT TO ELUDE THEM IN ANY WAY, HE SIMPLY WALKED 
25 AWAY. WHEN HE DID THAT, OFFICER DRAPER AND OFFICER BOOTS, OF 
1 COURSE HE WAS ATTACKED AND THROWN TO THE GROUND AND — AND 
2 ARRESTED AND LATER SEARCHED WHERE THEY FOUND THE EVIDENCE 
3 THAT WE INTEND — WE REQUEST BE SUPPRESSED. 
4 THE COURT: OKAY. 
5 MR. ALLEN: THAT'S THE CIRCUMSTANCE. 
6 THE COURT: THANK YOU. RESPONSE. DO YOU HAVE ANY 
7 ARGUMENT -- HAVE ANY OPENING STATEMENT YOU WANNA MAKE? 
8 MR. LYON: I ASSUME YOUR HONOR'S READ MY BRIEF. 
9 THE COURT: I HAVE. 
10 MR. LYON: AND I THINK WE'RE READY TO GO ON THAT. 
11 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. CALL YOUR WITNESS. 
12 MR. LYON: THE STATE CALLS OFFICER JAMIE BOOTS. 
13 JAMIE BOOTS, 
14 BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED 
15 AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
16 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
17 BY MR. LYON: 
18 Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, OCCUPATION, CURRENT 
19 ASSIGNMENT, AND EXPERIENCE? 
20 A. IT'S OFFICER JAMIE BOOTS. RIVERDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
21 PATROL OFFICER. I'VE BEEN A PATROL OFFICER — I'VE BEEN AN 
22 OFFICER FOR FOUR YEARS NOW. 
23 Q. WERE YOU -- PREVIOUS TO WORKING WITH RIVERDALE, WERE YOU 
24 EMPLOYED WITH OGDEN CITY POLICE? 
25 A. I WAS. 
1 Q. WERE YOU SO EMPLOYED ON NOVEMBER 27TH, 2 0 0 5 ? 
2 A . I WAS. 
3 Q. WERE YOU WORKING THAT DAY? 
4 A. I WAS. 
5 Q. AND AT APPROXIMATELY 1:54 A.M., WERE YOU DISPATCHED TO 
6| THE AREA OF JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 32ND — 
OR 3204 LINCOLN AVENUE? 
8I A. I WAS. 
9 Q. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE DISPATCH; DO YOU RECALL? 
10 A. IT WAS A DISTURBANCE FIGHT, THAT'S WHAT THE DISPATCH 
11 CAME IN AS. 
12 Q. WHEN YOU RESPONDED — DID YOU RESPOND THERE? 
13 A. I DID. 
14 Q. WHAT DID YOU OBSERVE WHEN YOU ARRIVED AT THE AREA? 
15 A. WHEN I PULLED INTO THE AREA, I DIDN'T SEE ANY 
16 INDIVIDUALS FIGHTING AT ALL. I EXITED MY VEHICLE. AND WAS 
17 TALKING WITH MY BACKING OFFICERS WHEN — 
18 Q. WHO WERE YOUR BACKING OFFICERS? 
19 A. THERE WAS OFFICER DRAPER AND HIS PROBATION OFFICER, 
2 0 AGERMAN. 
21 Q. OKAY. AND SO WHILE YOU WERE SPEAKING WITH — WITH 
22 OFFICER DRAPER, DID ANYTHING UNUSUAL HAPPEN WHILE YOU WERE 
23 SPEAKING WITH HIM? 
24 A. WHILE I WAS SPEAKING WITH HIM, WE WERE STANDING ON 
25 LINCOLN AVENUE, AND I HEARD SOME — KIND OF LIKE A BANG, AND 
1 TURNED AROUND AND NOTICED A GENTLEMAN FALLING AGAINST -- IN 
2 BETWEEN TWO VEHICLES PARKED IN THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE 
3 PARKING LOT. 
4 Q. OKAY. COULD YOU — I GUESS FOR THE COURT HELP — HELP 
5 US UNDERSTAND WHERE YOU — FROM WHERE YOU'RE STANDING, WHAT 
6 DO YOU SEE? DO YOU SEE THE FRONT OF JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP OR 
7 THE BACK OR WHAT — WHAT EXACTLY CAN YOU SEE FROM YOUR 
8 STANDPOINT? 
9 A. WHERE I'M PARKED ON LINCOLN AVENUE, I'M IN FRONT OF 
10 JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP, AND THEY HAVE A THROUGH PARKING LOT THAT 
11 DRIVES FROM LINCOLN INTO THE BACK PARKING LOT AND THEN ALSO 
12 GOES OUT TO 32ND STREET. WHERE I WAS PARKED, I COULD SEE 
13 RIGHT DOWN THE PARKING LOT INTO THE BACK AREA. 
14 Q. OKAY. AND IS THAT THAT TIME THAT YOU HEARD A BANG AND 
15 YOU LOOKED BACK AND YOU — YOU COULD SEE SOMEONE AT THAT 
16 TIME? 
17 A. I — I COULD. 
18 Q. OKAY. WHAT DID YOU DO AFTER YOU SAW THIS INDIVIDUAL? 
19 A. I APPROACHED HIM. OFFICER DRAPER AND MYSELF AND AGERMAN 
20 APPROACHED HIM TO SEE IF HE HAD SEEN ANY OF THE FIGHT. 
21 Q. OKAY. AND DID YOU SAY ANYTHING TO HIM? 
22 A. WHEN I APPROACHED HIM? 
2 3 Q. YES. 
24 A. WHEN I APPROACHED HIM, I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD ANY 
25 KNOWLEDGE OF ANY DISTURBANCE, ANY FIGHT, HE SAW ANYTHING. 
1 Q. OKAY. AND DO YOU RECALL WHAT ~ DID HE SAY ANYTHING IN 
2 RESPONSE TO YOU? 
3 A. HE DID. HE STATED, MAN, I DIDN'T DO SHIT. 
4 Q. DID YOU RESPOND TO THAT? 
5 A. I --
6 Q. DID YOU SAY ANYTHING IN RESPONSE TO THAT? 
7 I A. I JUST LOOKED AT HIM AND I COULD — WHY -- WHEN HE 
SPOKE, WHEN WE START APPROACHING HIM, NOTICEABLE SMELL OF 
9I ALCOHOL COMING FROM HIS BREATH WHEN HE SPOKE TO US. WE WERE 
10 WITHIN TWO, THREE FEET OF HIM AT THIS POINT. HE WAS HAVING A 
11 HARD TIME KEEPING HIS BALANCE, SWAYING BACK AND FORTH. AND I 
12 JUST LOOKED AT HIM AND SAID, THAT'S NOT WHAT I ASKED YOU, AND 
13 YOU'RE INTOXICATED. 
14 Q. OKAY. DID YOU NOTICE ANY OTHER — ANY OTHER 
15 CHARACTERISTICS THAT WOULD SUGGEST THAT HE HAD BEEN DRINKING? 
16 A. HIS EYES WERE BLOODSHOT. WHEN HE SPOKE TO ME, HIS 
17 SPEECH WAS SLURRED. LIKE I SAID, HE HAD A HARD TIME KEEPING 
18 HIS BALANCE. HE WAS ~ WHEN I NOTICED HIM, HE WAS KIND OF 
19 BOUNCING BACK AND FORTH OFF OF THE TWO CARS IN THE BACK 
20 PARKING LOT. THAT'S WHAT DREW MY ATTENTION TO HIM. 
21 Q. OKAY. AND AT THIS POINT IN TIME, WAS THERE ANYTHING 
22 ABOUT THE DEFENDANT THAT WAS MAKING YOU UNEASY? 
23 A. YEAH. HIS HANDS WERE INSIDE HIS POCKETS, AND THAT 
24 AREA'S KNOWN FOR HIGH CRIME, WEAPONS, YOU KNOW, FIGHTS. 
25 WE'RE DISPATCHED TO FIGHTS THERE ALL THE TIME. AND HE 
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1 STARTED FUMBLING AROUND WITH — HIS RIGHT HAND WAS INSIDE HIS 
2 FRONT SWEATSHIRT POCKET. HE HAD A ZIP-UP SWEATSHIRT. HIS 
3 HANDS WERE INSIDE IT AND I NOTICED HIS RIGHT HAND MOVING 
4 QUITE A BIT. AND SO I ASKED HIM IF HE WOULDN'T MIND TAKING 
5 HIS HANDS OUT OF HIS POCKETS FOR ME. 
6 Q. OKAY. NOW, WHEN YOU ASKED HIM -- DESCRIBE HOW YOU ASKED 
7 HIM. DID YOU ~ DID YOU SAY IT IN A FORCEFUL MANNEP? OR DO 
8 YOU RECALL THE EXACT LANGUAGE THAT YOU SAID TO HIM? 
9 A. I SAID, MAN, YOU WOULDN'T MIND TAKING YOUR HANDS OUT OF 
10 YOUR POCKETS, WOULD YOU? 
Ill Q. OKAY. AND DID HE RESPOND TO YOU? 
12 A. HE JUST KIND OF LOOKED AT US. HE TOOK HIS ONE HAND OUT 
13 AND JUST KIND OF PUT IT UP LIKE THIS AND THEN STUCK IT BACK 
14 IN, BUT THE OTHER ONE, HE JUST MOVED HIS SWEATSHIRT LIKE 
15 THIS, AND THEN PUT IT BACK DOWN. 
16 Q. OKAY. SO YOU — YOU'RE — WHAT YOU'RE SHOWING US, HE 
17 TOOK HIS LEFT HAND OUT OF HIS POCKET, BUT HE KEPT HIS RIGHT 
18 HAND INSIDE. 
19 A. HE DID. HE PULLED IT UP AND PULLED THE SWEATSHIRT AND 
20 THEN PUT HIS HAND BACK IN AND CLOSED HIS SWEATSHIRT BACK UP. 
21 Q. OKAY. WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THAT? 
22 A. I SAID, HEY, JUST TAKE YOUR HANDS OUT OF YOUR POCKETS 
2 3 FOR ME . 
24 Q. WAS -- WAS HE — WAS THE RIGHT-HAND REMAINED INSIDE THE 
2 5 RIGHT POCKET? 
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1 A. IT DID, AND HE STILL CONTINUED TO SHUFFLE HIS HAND 
2 AROUND. 
3 Q. OKAY. AND WHAT DID YOU DO AT THAT TIME? 
4 A. AFTER ASKING HIM MULTIPLE TIMES TO REMOVE HIS HANDS FROM 
51 HIS POCKETS AND HE WOULDN'T, I FINALLY SAID, OKAY, I'M NOT 
61 ASKING YOU THIS TIME. I'M TELLING YOU, TAKE YOUR HANDS OUT 
7 I OF YOUR POCKETS 
Q. OKAY. NOW, WHEN YOU'RE — WHILE YOU'VE ASKED — YOU SAY 
THAT YOU ASKED HIM SEVERAL TIMES TO TAKE HIS HANDS OUT OF HIS 
10| POCKETS. WAS HE WALKING AWAY FROM YOU AT THIS TIME? 
Ill A. NO. HE WAS JUST STANDING THERE TALKING TO US, JUST 
12 WOULDN'T TAKE HIS HANDS OUT OF HIS POCKETS. 
13 Q. OKAY. AND WHEN YOU FINALLY STATED, I'M NOT ASKING YOU, 
14 I'M TELLING YOU TO TAKE YOUR HANDS OUT OF HIS POCKET — OUT 
15 OF HIS POCKETS, WHAT DID — WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THAT? 
16 A. HE JUST KIND OF MUMBLED. I DON'T RECALL ANYTHING THAT 
17 WAS REALLY SAID. HE TURNED AND STARTED TO WALK AWAY FROM US. 
18 Q. OKAY. AND WHAT DID YOU DO? 
19 A. I YELLED AT HIM AGAIN, TAKE HIS HANDS OUT OF HIS 
20 POCKETS. HE BEGAN TO STEP EVEN FURTHER AWAY. AND BECAUSE OF 
21 IT BEING HIGH-CRIME AREA, ASSAULTS THERE ALL THE TIME, IT 
22 TURNED INTO AN OFFICER SAFETY ISSUE, WITH HIM TURNING AWAY 
23 FROM US, KEEPING HIS HANDS INSIDE HIS POCKETS. SO I REACHED 
24 OUT TO GRAB HIS LEFT HAND TO REMOVE IT FROM THE POCKET. 
25 Q. OKAY. AND I GUESS YOU'VE — YOU'VE TOUCHED A LITTLE BIT 
12 
1 ABOUT OFFICER SAFETY. HAVE YOU HAD, BASED ON YOUR 
2 EXPERIENCE, HAD PEOPLE TRY TO WALK AWAY FROM YOU AND THEN 
3 LATER TURNED AROUND WITH WEAPONS? 
4 A. I HAVE. 
5 MR. ALLEN: I'LL OBJECT. TALK ABOUT A LEADING QUESTION. 
6 THE COURT: SUSTAINED. 
7 Q. (BY MR. LYON) HAVE YOU HAD ENCOUNTERS WITH INDIVIDUALS 
8 WHO HAVE LATER HAD WEAPONS ON THEM? 
9 A. I HAVE. 
10 Q. OKAY. AND HAVE — HAVE THESE INDIVIDUALS TRIED TO WALK 
I 
111 AWAY FROM YOU? 
12 A. THEY HAVE. 
13 Q. OKAY. 
14 MR. ALLEN: AGAIN, I'LL OBJECT. IT'S IMMATERIAL. 
15 MR. LYON: YOUR HONOR, I DON'T THINK IT'S IMMATERIAL. 
16 WHAT THIS OFFICER'S TRYING TO STATE IS BASED ON HIS 
17 EXPERIENCE, HE'S HAD ~ 
18 MR. ALLEN: THE FACT THAT SOMEBODY MAY HAVE HAD A WEAPON 
19 AT SOME TIME AND TRIED TO WALK AWAY FROM HIM IS NOT THE POINT 
20 OF THIS SITUATION. AND IT'S IMMATERIAL TO THIS CASE. 
21 THE COURT: NO. GOES TO THE TERRY FRISK STOP PRINCIPLES 
22 OF AN OFFICER'S ABILITY TO PAT DOWN. OVERRULED. QUESTION 
23 WAS LEADING AGAIN, MR. ALLEN, BUT IT IS MATERIAL. GO AHEAD. 
24 Q. (BY MR. LYON) OKAY. AND WHAT DID YOU — WHEN HE STARTED 
25 TO WALK AWAY FROM YOU, WHAT DID YOU DO? 
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1 A. I REACHED OUT AFTER HE STARTED GAINING A FEW FEET ON ME. 
2 I REACHED OUT, STEPPED UP QUICKLY, GRABBED HIS LEFT ARM TO 
3 CONTROL HIS ONE ARM. AND AT THAT POINT, HAND STILL IN HIS 
4 RIGHT POCKET, HE TRIED TURNING AND PULLING AWAY FROM MY 
5 GRASP, AWAY FROM MY HOLD, AND TO MOVE FARTHER. AND SO THAT'S 
6 WHEN I PLACED HIM IN A TWIST LOCK AND ESCORTED HIM TO THE 
7 GROUND WHERE HE WAS PLACED ON HIS STOMACH. 
8 Q. OKAY. AND WERE YOU SAYING ANYTHING TO HIM AT THIS POINT 
9 IN TIME? 
10 A. I WAS THE WHOLE TIME, I WAS TELLING HIM, TAKE YOUR HAND 
11 OUT OF YOUR POCKET, GET YOUR HAND OUT, AND TELLING HIM QUIT 
12 RESISTING. WE'RE — EVERYTHING THAT YOU CAN SAY AT THAT 
13 POINT, WE JUST WANTED TO GET CONTROL OF THAT RIGHT HAND 
14 BECAUSE SOME MOVEMENT AND I COULDN'T SEE WHAT WAS INSIDE HIS 
15 HAND. 
16 Q. WAS HE — WAS HE — WHAT WAS HE DOING AT THIS POINT IN 
17 TIME? 
18 A. HE WAS FIGHTING WITH US THE WHOLE TIME TRYING TO GET OUT 
19 OF OUR HOLD. 
20 Q. OKAY. DID YOU DO ANYTHING TO TRY TO GET THAT RIGHT HAND 
21 OUT FROM THE POCKET? 
22 A. I DID. AFTER HE WAS TAKEN TO THE GROUND, I HAD CONTROL 
23 OF HIS LEFT ARM. OFFICER AGERMAN WAS TRYING TO PULL HIS 
24 RIGHT HAND OUT FROM UNDERNEATH HIS TORSO BECAUSE HE WOULDN'T 
25 REMOVE IT STILL FROM THE POCKET AFTER BEING ON THE GROUND. 
14 
1 AND SO I ENDED UP EXERTING TWO DISTRACTION BLOWS TO THE LOWER 
2 LEFT SIDE OF HIS BACK. 
3 Q. OKAY. 
4 A. SO THAT THEY COULD GET CONTROL OF THAT ARM. 
5 Q. DO YOU KNOW OF ANY — IF ANYTHING ELSE, ANY SORT OF 
6 DISTRACTION BLOWS WERE DELIVERED TO THE DEFENDANT BESIDE WHAT 
7| YOU — 
A. I BELIEVE THAT OFFICER DRAPER EXERTED SOME DISTRACTION 
BLOWS. 
101 Q. OKAY. 
Ill MR. ALLEN: I'M NOT SURPRISED. 
12 Q. (BY MR. LYON) WERE YOU FINALLY ABLE TO GET THE — WERE 
13 YOU FINALLY ABLE TO GET THE RIGHT HAND OUT OF THE POCKET? 
14 A. AFTER THE DISTRACTION BLOWS WERE EXERTED, OFFICER 
15 AGERMAN WAS ABLE TO PULL HIS HAND FROM UNDERNEATH HIS TORSO 
16 AND GET CONTROL OF THE RIGHT ARM. 
17 Q. OKAY. DID YOU HANDCUFF HIM? 
18 A. I DID. 
19 Q. AND WHILE HANDCUFFING THE DEFENDANT, DID YOU OBSERVE 
20 ANYTHING UNUSUAL? 
21 A. I DID. IN HIS RIGHT HAND, I NOTICED A CLEAR PLASTIC 
22 BAGGIE STILL GRIPPED IN HIS HAND. WHEN I PLACED IN HIS RIGHT 
23 HAND INTO THE CUFF, I ALREADY HAD HIS LEFT HAND IN THE CUFF. 
24 WHEN I PLACED HIS RIGHT HAND IN THE CUFF, I OPENED HIS HAND 
25 AND NOTICED A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF WHITE IVORY ROCK LIKE 
15 
1 SUBSTANCE THAT WAS LATER N.I.K. TESTED AND TESTED POSITIVE 
2 FOR COCAINE. 
3 Q. OKAY. DID YOU STAND HIM UP AFTER THAT? 
4 A. WE ROLLED HIM OVER. WE SEARCHED THE REST OF HIS PERSON. 
5 AND THEN WE STOOD HIM UP AND ESCORTED HIM TO MY VEHICLE. 
6 Q. OKAY. DID HE RECEIVE ANY MEDICAL ATTENTION? 
7 A. NO. I ASKED HIM SEVERAL TIMES IF HE WANTED ANY MEDICAL 
8 ATTENTION. THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF INJURY TO HIM VISUALLY, 
9 AND HE JUST KEPT RESPONDING WITH PROFANITIES, AND DECLINED. 
10 Q. OKAY. AND ONE THING I FORGOT TO BRING OUT, OFFICER 
11 BOOTS. GOING BACK TO THE — WHEN YOU INITIALLY SAW THE — 
12 WHEN YOU'RE STANDING OUT ON LINCOLN STREET AND YOU INITIALLY 
13 HEARD THIS BANG NOISE, AND YOU LOOK OVER AND YOU SEE WHOSE --
14 SEE THIS INDIVIDUAL IN THE PARKING LOT, DID YOU — DID YOU — 
15 WERE YOU ABLE TO SEE IN WHAT DIRECTION THIS INDIVIDUAL WAS 
16 HEADING? 
17 A. YES, I DID. HE WAS — HE WAS, LIKE I SAID, IN THE BACK 
18 SOUTHWEST -- OR SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE PARKING LOT IN 
19 BETWEEN TWO VEHICLES. AND IT'S FENCED ALL ALONG BOTH SIDES, 
20 AND HE WAS WALKING COMING OUT OF THE VEHICLES TOWARD THE 
21 CORNER OF THE BARBERSHOP INTO THE MIDDLE OF THE PARKING LOT. 
22 Q. OKAY. AND IS THAT -- I GUESS IF HE'S HEADING THAT 
23 DIRECTION, IS THAT HEADED TOWARD 32ND STREET? 
24 A. YES. 
25 Q. AND ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH 32ND STREET? 
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A. I AM. I PATROLLED THE AREA FOR A YEAR LAST YEAR. 
Q. OKAY. WHAT'S THAT STREET LIKE? 
MR. ALLEN: I'LL OBJECT. IMMATERIAL. WHAT'S IT LIKE. 
YOU KNOW WHAT 32ND STREET'S LIKE? 
THE COURT: WELL — 
MR. ALLEN: FIRST OF ALL, THE QUES — THE QUESTION IS 
VAGUE. DOESN'T — I DON'T KNOW WHAT HE'S EVEN ASKING. 
SECOND, WHAT'S 32ND STREET LIKE, THAT'S IMMATERIAL. 
THE COURT: I AGREE THE QUESTION COULD BE — THE 
QUESTION COULD BE BETTER PUT, BUT THE QUESTION FOR TERRY 
FRISK AND STOP IS WHAT THE NEIGHBORHOOD AREA IS LIKE IN 
RELATIONSHIP TO CRIME. IF THAT'S WHERE HE'S HEADED, IT'S 
MATERIAL AND RELEVANT. IF THAT'S NOT WHERE HE'S HEADED AND 
HE JUST WANTS TO TELL ME IT'S A STREET FULL OF POTHOLES, I 
AGREE WITH YOU, MR. ALLEN. SO THE QUESTION NEEDS TO BE 
REPHRASED, MR. LYON. 
MR. LYON: I'LL REPHRASE — I'LL RESTATE THE QUESTION. 
Q. (BY MR. LYON) IS 32ND STREET A BUSY STREET? 
A. DURING THE NIGHTTIME, IT'S ONE OF THE BUSIEST STREETS IN 
THAT AREA, YES. 
Q. OKAY. NOW, OFFICER BOOTS, I'VE HAD A CHANCE TO READ 
YOUR POLICE REPORT AND YOU'VE INDICATED TODAY ON THE STAND 
231 SEVERAL THINGS THAT ARE NOT INSIDE YOUR POLICE REPORT. DO 
24 YOU HAVE AN EXPLANATION AS TO WHY THAT IS? 
25 A. A POLICE REPORT'S MAINLY JUST TO — SO THAT WE CAN 
17 
1 RECALL THE ACCOUNTS, TO REFRESH OUR MEMORIES. CAN'T ALWAYS 
2 PUT EVERYTHING, EVERY LITTLE DETAIL IN THE REPORT. IT'S 
3 IMPOSSIBLE, IT'LL NEVER HAPPEN. AND SO WE WRITE THESE 
4| REPORTS TO REFRESH OUR MEMORIES WHEN WE TESTIFY IN SITUATIONS 
LIKE THIS. 
MR. LYON: NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT: MR. ALLEN. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ALLEN: 
101 Q. SO AT THE TIME THAT YOU WROTE THE REPORT, YOU DIDN'T 
11 THINK IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PUT IN THE REPORT WHAT DREW YOUR 
12 ATTENTION TO THIS PERSON; IS THAT RIGHT? 
13 A. NOW — 
14 Q. THIS PERSON THAT YOU JUST ARRESTED AND CAME UP WITH A 
15 REASON TO ARREST, YOU DIDN'T THINK IT WAS IMPORTANT IN 
16 WRITING THE REPORT TO COME UP WITH SOME REASON THAT HE DREW 
17 YOUR ATTENTION TO HIM; IS THAT RIGHT? 
18 A. DREW MY ATTENTION, IT COULD HAVE BEEN PUT IN THERE. 
19 IT'S NOT REALLY DETRIMENTAL TO THE CASE BECAUSE — 
20 Q. I DON'T WANT YOUR IMPRESSION OF WHETHER IT'S DETRIMENTAL 
21 TO THE CASE. WHAT I'M ASKING YOU IS, THE REASON THAT YOU 
22 SUPPOSEDLY HAD YOUR ATTENTION DRAWN TO THIS INDIVIDUAL, YOU 
23 DIDN'T THINK WAS MATERIAL; IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE TELLING US 
24 TODAY? 
25 A. NO, THAT'S NOT WHAT I'M TELLING YOU --
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Q. HONESTLY, OFFICER BOOTS? 
A. NO, THAT'S NOT WHAT I'M TELLING YOU. 
Q. OKAY. SO IT WASN'T IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO PUT IN YOUR 
REPORT. 
A. IT COULD HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT. 
Q. BUT IT WASN'T BECAUSE YOU DIDN'T, RIGHT? 
A. I DIDN'T PUT IT IN THE REPORT. 
Q. OKAY. AND NOT ONLY DIDN'T YOU PUT IT YOUR REPORT, BUT 
OFFICER DRAPER DIDN'T PUT IT IN HIS REPORT EITHER, DID HE? 
MR. LYON: YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO OBJECT TO THAT — 
THE WITNESS: I DIDN'T WRITE OFFICER DRAPER'S REPORT, SO 
I CAN'T ANSWER THAT QUESTION. 
Q. (BY MR. A1LEN) WELL, I HAVE IT RIGHT HERE. WOULD YOU 
LIKE TO LOOK AT IT? 
A. NO, BECAUSE I'M NOT TESTIFYING FOR OFFICER DRAPER. 
Q. OH, NOW YOU'RE A LAWYER. 
A. NO, I'M JUST — 
MR. ALLEN: MAY I APPROACH THE BENCH, YOUR HONOR? 
THE WITNESS: -- HERE FOR ME. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
21 MR. AiLEN: THANK YOU. 
22 Q. (BY MR. ALLEN) I'D LIKE YOU TO PERUSE OFFICER DRAPER'S 
23 REPORT AND JUST ANSWER THE QUESTION, IS THERE ANYTHING IN 
24 THAT REPORT ABOUT ANYBODY BANGING ON CARS, RICOCHETING OFF OF 





A. YOU'LL HAVE TO ASK OFFICER DRAPER THAT — 
Q. NO, I'M ASKING YOU TO LOOK AT THE REPORT AND — 
MR. LYON: YOUR HONOR, I'M GONNA OBJECT AS TO RELEVANCE. 
THE COURT: WELL, IT IS RELEVANT — 
MR. ALLEN: HE'S -- HE'S BROUGHT UP — 
THE COURT: -- HAVE YOU READ THE REPORT — 
MR. ALLEN: — THE THING ABOUT THE REPORTS. I'M TRYING 
TO FIND OUT --
THE COURT: HAVE YOU READ THE REPORT? IS OFFICER DRAPER 
HERE? 
MR. LYON: NO. 
THE COURT: HAVE YOU READ THE REPORT? DOES IT CONTAIN 













MR. LYON: I'VE READ THE REPORT. I'M NOT SURE EXACTLY 
WHAT — AS FAR AS BANGING GOES, I DON'T — I DON'T RECALL 
READING ANYTHING LIKE THAT. 
THE COURT: POINT'S MADE, MR. ALLEN. MOVE ON. 
MR. ALLEN: MAY I APPROACH AGAIN, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. BECAUSE I AGREE, THIS OFFICER 
CAN'T BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR A REPORT HE DIDN'T WRITE. 
MR. ALLEN: WELL, BUT HE DID RAISE THE ISSUE OF WHAT 
REPORTS WERE FOR. 
THE COURT: I AGREE. 
MR. ALLEN: AND I THINK IT'S VERY INTERESTING THAT BOTH 
OFFICERS FIND IT IMMATERIAL TO WRITE WHY THEY THOUGHT THAT — 
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WHY THEIR ATTENTION WAS DRAWN TO THIS PERSON. 
THE COURT: AND AS I SAID, POINT'S MADE. 
MR. ALLEN: THANK YOU. 
Q. (BY MR. ALLEN) IN FACT, WOULD IT SURPRISE YOU TO KNOW 
THAT OTHER REPORT — OFFICER DRAPER'S REPORT SAYS HE JUST SAW 
THAT YOU SAW HIM WALKING IN THE REAR DRIVEWAY AREA. PERIOD. 
AND THAT IS THE ONLY DISCUSSION ABOUT WHAT HE WAS DOING BACK 
THERE. 
A. YOU'LL HAVE TO TALK TO OFFICER DRAPER ABOUT THAT. 
Q. OKAY. LET'S TALK ABOUT YOUR REPORT. YOU SAID THAT YOU 
HAD A REFUSED COMPLAINANT AT 1:54 IN THE MORNING — 
A. YES. 
Q. — RIGHT? 1:54 IN THE MORNING YOU APPEARED AT JESSIE'S 
BARBERSHOP BECAUSE YOU WERE TOLD THAT PEOPLE WERE PHYSICALLY 
FIGHTING IN FRONT OF JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP. DO YOU KNOW WHEN 
YOU GOT THAT DISPATCH, WHAT TIME? 









Q. DO YOU KNOW HOW LONG IT TOOK YOU TO GET TO JESSIE'S 
BARBERSHOP FROM THE TIME YOU GOT THE DISPATCH? 
A. I DON'T. 
Q. BY THE TIME YOU GOT THERE, THERE WAS NOTHING IN FRONT OF 
JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP, WAS THERE? 
A. NO. 





Q. THERE WAS NO REFUSED COMPLAINANT? 
A. YEAH, THERE WAS A REFUSED COMPLAINANT. 
Q. THERE WAS NO REFUSED COMPLAINANT STANDING THERE IN FRONT 
OF JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP. 
A. A REFUSED COMPLAINANT MEANS THEY DON'T WANT CONTACT — 
Q. I GET IT, AND HE WASN'T THERE, WAS HE? 
A. NO. 
Q. AND NOBODY ELSE WAS THERE IN FRONT OF THE BARBERSHOP. 
A. NO. 
Q. AND AS YOU LOOKED DOWN THE STREET, WAS THERE SOMEBODY 















A. NOT AT THE TIME I WAS THERE. 
Q. OKAY. SO AT THAT POINT IN TIME, THE REASON YOU HAD BEEN 
CALLED APPARENTLY HAD DISSIPATED ON ITS OWN, SO THERE WAS NO 
REASON FOR YOU TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE THAT ISSUE; IS THAT 
RIGHT? 
A. NO, THAT'S NOT THE CASE. THERE COULD HAVE BEEN SOMEONE 
INJURED THAT EVERYBODY RAN FROM. 
Q. DID YOU SEE SOMEBODY INJURED? 
A. I DID NOT. THAT'S WHY I STOOD IN THE AREA FOR A FEW 
MINUTES. 
Q. YOU THEN, ACCORDING TO YOUR REPORT, SAID, MICHAEL 
HENDERSON WAS NOTICED STUMBLING AROUND IN THE BACK PARKING 
LOT OF JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP. 
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1 A. YES. 
2 Q. AGAIN, NO DESCRIPTION OF HIM BANGING OFF OF CARS OR ANY 
3 NOISE WHATSOEVER. 
4 A. NOT IN THAT REPORT, NO. 
5 Q. AND THIS IS AT 1:54 IN THE MORNING? 
6 A. IF THAT'S WHAT'S ON THE REPORT. I DON'T RECALL. IT WAS 
7 MANY MONTHS AGO. 
8 Q. LITTLE DARK AT THAT TIME, ISN'T IT? 
9 A. YES, THAT'S A DARK AREA. 
10 Q. OKAY. AND SO WHEN YOU WENT BACK AND NOTICED SOMEBODY IN 
11 THE BACK PARKING LOT, YOU WENT BACK TO ASK HIM IF HE KNEW 
12 ANYTHING ABOUT THIS DISTURBANCE. 
13 A. I DID. 
14 Q. WHICH WAS AN APPROPRIATE THING TO DO. 
15 A. IT IS. 
16 Q. AND HE SAID, I DIDN'T SEE SHIT, I DIDN'T DO SHIT --
17 A. THAT'S --
18 Q. — I'M NOT THERE. 
19 A. YES. 
20 Q. AND THEN HE ATTEMPTED TO WALK AWAY. 
21 A. NO, HE DID NOT. 
22 Q. THAT'S WHAT YOUR REPORT SAYS. 
23 A. NO. AFTER THE MULTIPLE TIMES OF ASKING HIM TO REMOVE 
24 HIS HANDS FROM POCKETS AFTER I STOOD THERE AND TALKED WITH 
25 HIM. THERE WERE SEVERAL CHANCES FOR HIM TO WALK AWAY PRIOR 
1 TO ME ASKING HIM TO REMOVE HIS HANDS. 
2 Q. YOU INDICATE IN YOUR REPORT, MICHAEL — I TOLD MICHAEL 
3 TO STOP AND TAKE HIS HANDS OUT OF HIS POCKET — OH, 
4 OFFICER -- MYSELF, OFFICER DRAPER, OFFICER AGERMAN, AND HE 
5 BEGAN TO — MICHAEL IMMEDIATELY TURNED AWAY — THIS IS YOUR 
6 REPORT. MICHAEL IMMEDIATELY TURNED AWAY FROM OFFICER DRAPER, 
7 I OFFICER AGERMAN, AND MYSELF, AND BEGAN TO WALK AWAY. I TOLD 
MICHAEL TO STOP AND TAKE HIS HAND OUT OF HIS POCKETS. 
MICHAEL WAS BEGINNING TO GAIN DISTANCE FROM ME. I REACHED 
101 OUT AND GRABBED HIS LEFT ARM, PULLING TO THE — TO THE — 
11 PULLED HIM TO YOUR CONTROL THING, YOU SAID. 
12 A. IT ALSO STATES IN THERE THAT BEFORE HE GOT TO THAT 
13 SECOND SENTENCE IN THERE THAT IT SAID, I ASKED — 
14 Q. AND YOU — 
15 A. — MICHAEL HENDERSON TO REMOVE HIS HANDS FROM HIS 
16 POCKETS. 
17 Q. YOU IN FACT SAID — AND I'LL QUOTE WHAT YOU'VE JUST 
18 TESTIFIED TO. YOU IN FACT SAID, YOU WOULDN'T MIND TAKING 
19 YOUR HAND OUT OF YOUR POCKET, WOULD YOU. 
20 A. RIGHT. 
21 Q. THAT'S WHAT YOU SAID. 
22 A. THAT'S WHAT I SAID THE INITIAL TIME. 
23 Q. THAT'S NOT A POLICE COMMAND. 
24 A. NO, NOT THE FIRST TIME. AND DID -- AND I ALSO TESTIFIED 
25 TO LATER AFTER THE THIRD OR FOURTH TIME, I CAN'T RECALL 
EXACTLY, I STATED, OKAY. I'M NOT ASKING YOU NOW, I'M TELLING 
YOU, TAKE YOUR HANDS OUT — 
Q. I HEARD YOU SAY THAT ~ 
A. — OF YOUR POCKETS — 
Q. I HEARD YOU SAY THAT. HOW — HOW OFTEN HAD YOU AS AN 
OGDEN CITY POLICE OFFICER WORKED WITH OFFICER DRAPER? 
A. QUITE A BIT. 
Q. IS HE THE ONE WHO TAUGHT YOU THE -- WHAT WAS PROBABLE 
CAUSE AND WHEN — WHEN IT WAS OKAY TO USE FORCE? 
A. NO, HE DID NOT. 
Q. I SEE. WHY DID OFFICER DRAPER HAVE A PROBATION OFFICER 
THERE WITH HIM? 
A. BECAUSE HE'S AN F.T.O. AND THERE WAS A NEW HIRE THAT IS 
GOING THROUGH HIS TEST PHASE. 
Q. WAS HE THERE TO BE — TO ACT AS A PROBATION OFFICER TO 
YOU OR ACT AS A PROBATION OFFICER TO OFFICER DRAPER? 
YOU SAID HE WAS THERE AS A PROBATION OFFICER. I 
DIDN'T -- I DIDN'T MAKE THAT UP. 
A. OKAY. OFFICER DRAPER IS OFFICER AGERMAN'S F.T.O., HIS 
FIELD TRAINING OFFICER — 
Q. SO HE'S THE — 
A. OFFICER AGERMAN — 
Q. -- OFFICER THAT'S ON PROBATION. 
A. YES. 
Q. BEING TRAINED BY OFFICER DRAPER. 
25 
1 A. YES. 
21 Q. NOW, WERE YOU TRAINED BY OFFICER DRAPER IN THAT SAME 
MANNER --
4 1 A. NO, I WAS NOT. 
5 Q. SO YOU LEARNED YOUR TECHNIQUES FROM SOME OTHER OFFICER. 
6 A. YES, I DID. 
7 J Q. I SEE. WHEN YOU INDICATE YOU ESCORTED HIM TO THE 
GROUND, YOUR THREW HIM DOWN. 
91 A. NO, I DID NOT. 
10 Q. TO CONTROL HIM; ISN'T THAT CORRECT? 
11 A. NO, I DID NOT. 
12 Q. I SEE. AND THEN YOU AND BOTH — BOTH YOU AND OFFICER 
13 APER — OFFICER DRAPER EXERCISED DISTRACTION BLOWS, YOU'VE 
14 TESTIFIED, RIGHT? 
15 A. I BELIEVE OFFICER DRAPER DID. I HAVE NOT READ HIS 
16 REPORT. HE WAS BEHIND ME — 
17 Q. YOU TESTIFIED TO THAT; I DIDN'T MAKE THAT UP. 
18 A. I KNOW, AND I SAID I BELIEVE HE DID. 
19 Q. I NOTICE IN THE POLICE REPORT INDICATION OF A N.I.K. 
20 TEST ON THE STUFF YOU SAY YOU FOUND. I DON'T NOTICE ANY 
21 BREATHALYZER TEST OR ANY TYPE OF INDICATION TO DETERMINE THE 
22 ALCOHOLIC CONTENT OF MR. HENDERSON. 
23 A. WE'RE NOT REQUIRED TO DO --
24 Q. I DIDN'T ASK THAT --
25 A. — BREATHALYZER --
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1 Q. — I NOTICE THERE WASN'T ONE. 
2 A. THAT'S BECAUSE I DIDN'T DO ONE. 
3 MR. ALLEN: I SEE. NOTHING FURTHER. 
4 THE COURT: REDIRECT? 
5 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. LYON: 
7 Q. OFFICER BOOTS, WHEN YOU WENT BACK TO — TO THE BACK OF 
8 JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP AND SPOKE WITH DEFENDANT, HOW QUICKLY DID 
9 YOU NOTICE THE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION? 
10 A. IMMEDIATELY. 
11 Q. OKAY. AND WAS THERE ANYONE ELSE IN THAT AREA? 
12 A. NO. 
13 Q. COULD YOU ~ YOU STATED THAT YOU COULD SMELL ALCOHOL? 
14 A. I COULD. 
15 Q. HOW STRONG WAS THAT SMELL? 
16 A. IT WAS STRONG ENOUGH THAT I COULD SMELL IT FROM THREE OR 
17 FOUR FEET AWAY. 
18 Q. OKAY. AND HOW QUICKLY DID YOU OBSERVE HIS PHYSICAL 
19 SIGNS OF INTOXICATION? 
20 A. IMMEDIATELY FROM THE MOMENT I SAW HIM FROM LINCOLN 
21 STUMBLING IN BETWEEN THE TWO CARS TO THE POINT TO WHERE I 
22 APPROACHED HIM, HE WAS UNEASY ON HIS FEET. 
23 MR. LYON: OKAY. NOTHING FURTHER. 






BY MR. ALLEN: 
Q. JUST — JUST TO MAKE THIS ONE POINT FAIRLY CLEAR, YOU 
DON'T MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT CARS IN THAT PARKING LOT AT ALL 
IN YOUR REPORT, DO YOU? 
A. I DO NOT. 
Q. YOU DON'T MENTION ANY STUMBLING BETWEEN CARS. 
A. DO NOT. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE? 
MR. ALLEN: NOTHING FURTHER. 
EXAMINATION 














Q. WELL, I GOT A COUPLE QUESTIONS. JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP, IS 
THIS A RESIDENTIAL AREA OR A COMMERCIAL AREA? 
A. IT'S A RESIDENTIAL AREA, BUT IT'S A BUSINESS IN THE 
RESIDENTIAL AREA. 
Q. DESCRIBE IT TO ME. I MEAN, IS IT A BIG PLAZA WITH 
MULTIPLE BUSINESSES — 
A. NO, IT'S ~ IT'S A — IT'S LIKE A HOUSE. IT'S THE SIZE 
OF A HOUSE THAT HE'S TURNED INTO A BARBERSHOP UPSTAIRS. 
Q. OKAY. THE AREA, IS IT A HIGH-CRIME, MODERATE-CRIME, 
LOW-CRIME AREA? DO YOU — 
A. IT'S A HIGH-CRIME. 
Q. AND YOU SAID YOU WORKED THERE FOR A YEAR? 
A. I DID. 
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Q. ALL RIGHT. AND THAT WAS YOUR PATROL AREA? 
A. IT WAS. 
Q. NOW, WHEN YOU MADE THE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION ON 
MR. HENDERSON, DID YOU EVER SAY THE MAGIC WORDS THAT HE WAS 
UNDER ARREST? 
A. THE ATTORNEY AND I TALKED ABOUT IT, AND EVERYTHING 
HAPPENED SO FAST THAT I WAS — I CAN'T REMEMBER IF I TOLD HIM 
OR NOT. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. DID YOU BOOK HIM FOR PUBLIC INTOXICATION? 
A. I DID. 
Q. SO THAT WAS ON THE BOOKING? 
A. IT WAS. 
Q. AND HAS HE BEEN CHARGED WITH PUBLIC INTOXICATION? 
MR. LYON: YES. 
THE WITNESS: AFTER HE WAS PLACED IN MY VEHICLE, HE WAS 
TOLD WHAT — EVERYTHING HE WAS BEING CHARGED WITH. 
Q. (BY THE COURT) DURING THE TIME THAT YOU INDICATE THAT HE 
WAS WRESTLING OR STRUGGLING WITH YOU, DID YOU PLACE HIM UNDER 
ARREST FOR INTERFERING OR ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE? 
A. I DID. I ~ I CAN'T REMEMBER IF I PUT INTERFERING ON 
211 THERE OR NOT. 
22 Q. WELL, DID YOU EVER SAY THE MAGIC WORDS — 
23 I'LL BE CANDID. THE ISSUE HERE IS WHETHER OR NOT YOU 
24 HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A TERRY STOP, AND THEN WHETHER YOU CAN 












IMMEDIATE ARREST. BUT WHAT'S IMPORTANT I S WHAT STEPS ARE 
TAKEN IN REGARDS TO THE ARREST. 
ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU, OFFICER. YOU MAY STAND DOWN. 
ANY OTHER WITNESSES? WE GONNA HEAR FROM OFFICER DRAPER OR 
OFFICER AGERMAN? 
MR. LYON: NO. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WANNA RESPOND TO MR. ALLEN'S 
OPENING STATEMENT? 
MR. LYON: YOUR HONOR, WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS OFFICER 
BOOTS GOES TO JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP ON THE COMPLAINT OF 















AGERMAN. HE'S HANGING OUT. DOESN'T SEE ANYTHING. THEY'RE 
JUST KIND OF TALKING WITH ONE ANOTHER. OFFICER BOOTS HEARS 
THIS BANGING UP AGAINST A VEHICLE. HE GOES TO LOOK AT THIS 
INDIVIDUAL WHO IS — AT THE TIME, HE'S WALKING TOWARD 32ND 
STREET, WHICH IS A BUSY STREET. HE GOES BACK JUST TO TALK 
WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL. SAYS, HEY, HAVE YOU SEEN ANY FIGHTING, 
HE SAYS, MAN, I DIDN'T DO SHIT. AND AT THAT POINT IN TIME, 
OFFICER BOOTS SMELLS STRONG ODOR OF ALCOHOL, SEES BLOODSHOT 
EYES, SEES — I GUESS OBSERVES SLURRED SPEECH. HE OBSERVES 
THAT THE DEFENDANT IS HAVING A HARD TIME MAINTAINING HIS 
BALANCE AT THAT TIME, AS WELL AS WHEN HE INITIALLY SAW THIS 
INDIVIDUAL BANGING UP AGAINST CARS, HAVING A HARD TIME 
MAINTAINING HIS BALANCE. 
YOUR HONOR, IT'S THE STATE'S POSITION AT THAT POINT IN 
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1 TIME THAT OFFICER BOOTS HAS PROBABLE CAUSE THAT HE CAN FAKE 
2 AN ARREST OF THIS INDIVIDUAL FOR PUBLIC INTOX TO KEEP HIM --
3 HIMSELF OR THE PUBLIC SAFE. HE'S — 
4 THE COURT: BUT WHAT LEADS ME TO BELIEVE HE' S MAKING 
5 ARREST? ALL HE EVER ASKED HIM TO DO WAS TO TAKE HIS HANDS 
6 OUT OF HIS POCKET. THAT'S SEEMS TO ME TO BE A SEARCH. AT 
7 TWO -- TWO OPPORTUNITIES THIS OFFICER HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
8 SAY THE MAGIC WORDS, YOU'RE UNDER ARREST FOR PUBLIC 
9 INTOXICATION. NOW TAKE YOUR HANDS OUT OF YOUR POCKET. OR 
10 YOU'RE UNDER ARREST FOR INTERFERING WITH A POLICE OFFICER. 
Ill NOW TAKE YOUR HANDS OUT OF YOUR POCKET. 
12 ALL HE EVER ASKS THIS PERSON TO DO WAS TO TAKE HIS HANDS 
13 OUT OF HIS POCKET AND SHOW HIM WHAT'S THERE. NOW, HOW DO 
14 I — HOW DO I GET BEYOND THIS — A TERRY FRISK STOP IN THE 
15 FIRST INSTANCE? HOW DO WE GET TO AN ARREST? DON'T THEY SAY 
16 THE MAGIC WORDS? 
17 MR. LYON: WELL, I GUESS, YOUR HONOR, THE WAY THAT 
18 OFFICER BOOTS — MY UNDERSTANDING FROM HIS TESTIMONY IS HE'S 
19 SAYING HE'S — THAT HE SAID, WELL, DO YOU MIND TAKING YOUR 
20 HANDS OUT OF YOUR POCKETS. AND HE — THE DEFENDANT TAKES HIS 
21 LEFT HAND OUT OF HIS POCKET, BUT HE KEEPS HIS RIGHT HAND 
22 INSIDE HIS POCKET. AND THAT WAS THE HAND THAT OFFICER BOOTS 
23 TESTIFIED THAT HE HAD SEEN FIDGETING AND THAT WAS THE HAND 
24 THAT WAS MAKING HIM NERVOUS. 
25 THE COURT: OKAY. SO DOESN'T THAT THEN UNDER THE STOP 
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1 AND FRISK OF TERRY JUSTIFY A PAT-DOWN SEARCH BY THE OFFICER, 
2 BUT HOW DO WE GO TO FULL-FLEDGED ARREST WHEN ONCE AGAIN, THE 
3 OFFICER'S ONLY FOCUS FROM HIS TESTIMONY IS TAKE YOUR HANDS 
4 I OUT OF THE POCKET. I WANNA SEE WHAT' S IN YOUR POCKET. WHAT 
HAVE YOU GOT IN YOUR HAND. 
61 MR. LYON: WELL, YOU — 
71 THE COURT: IT SEEMS TO BE ON SEARCH, NOT ON ARREST. I 
MEAN HE COULD HAVE VERY EASILY JUST AT THAT POINT SAID, 
91 YOU'RE UNDER ARREST FOR PUBLIC INTOXICATION, HANDCUFFED HIM, 
10 SEARCHED HIM, AND WE'RE NOT EVEN HERE. 
11 MR. LYON: I — YOUR HONOR, MY UNDERSTANDING IS THIS 
12 HAPPENED SO QUICKLY THAT HE DOESN'T HAVE TIME TO SAY, YOU'RE 
13 UNDER — YOU'RE UNDER ARREST. HE'S — HE'S FIDGETING WITH 
14 SOMETHING IN HIS HAND. HE'S — HE'S TAKING STEP AWAY FROM 
15 ME. OFFICER BOOTS IS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT HIM PULLING A 
16 WEAPON OUT FROM INSIDE OF HIS POCKET THAN SAYING — AND 
17 TRYING TO WORRY ABOUT HIS OWN PERSONAL SAFETY THAN SAYING, 
18 YOU'RE UNDER ARREST. AND — 
19 THE COURT: BUT THAT ENDS — THAT ENDS ANY INQUIRY. MY 
20 NEXT QUESTION IS HOW DOES THIS DIFFER FROM THE CASE THAT 
21 JUDGE HADLEY WAS REVERSED ON WITH THE GUY RIDING THE BICYCLE 
22 UP AT WEBER STATE WHEN THE GUY RODE HIS BICYCLE AWAY AND THE 
23 POLICE WENT AND GOT HIM AND PULLED HIM OVER, GOT IN A TUSSLE, 
24 WRESTLED WITH HIM, AND THEN THE OFFICER, RATHER THAN PATTING 
25 HIM DOWN, REACHED DOWN AND LIFTED UP THE GUY'S LEG AND FOUND 
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A WEAPON THERE, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS SAID, ON A STOP AND 
FRISK, ALL YOU CAN DO IS PAT DOWN, OR IF YOU CAN ESCALATE 
YOUR PROBABLE CAUSE TO AN ARREST, MAKE YOUR ARREST. SO HOW 
DOES THIS DIFFER FROM THAT CASE THAT WAS A COUPLE MONTHS AGO 
WHERE ~ 
MR. LYON: YOUR HONOR, I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE — I KNOW 
I'VE READ THAT CASE. IT'S BEEN A WHILE, AND I CAN'T --
THE COURT: IT'S IN YOUR GUY'S THING. I'M HAVING THE 
LAW CLERKS PULL --
MR. LYON: I'LL BE HAPPY TO RESPOND TO THAT IF YOUR 
HONOR WOULD LIKE — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. LYON: — WITH A SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OR WHATEVER 
YOU'D LIKE, BUT — 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. MR. ALLEN, YOU GOT A 
RESPONSE? 
MR. ALLEN: I DO. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. THIS OFFICER 
HAS A PROBLEM, YOUR HONOR. THIS CASE HAPPENS 1:54 AT NIGHT. 
IT'S DARK, PURSUANT TO HIS OWN DESCRIPTION. WE ALL KNOW IT'S 
DARK AT 1:54 AT NIGHT. HE WRITES A VERY DETAILED REPORT, 
POLICE REPORT, ABOUT THIS INCIDENT. HE WRITES TWO PAGES OF 
REPORT. OFFICER DRAPER WRITES A SUBSEQUENT PAGE OF REPORT. 
NEITHER ONE OF THEM MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT A NOISE, ABOUT 
BANGING, ABOUT BUMPING INTO ANYTHING, ABOUT CAUSING ANY KIND 
OF DISTURBANCE. WHAT'S HAPPENED HERE IS THEY'VE GONE THROUGH 
1 THIS SITUATION, KNOCKED THIS GUY DOWN BECAUSE HE WASN'T 
2 COMPLYING WITH THEIR ORDERS, WHICH WERE NOT APPROPRIATELY 
3 TAKEN BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T PUT HIM UNDER ARREST AND DIDN'T 
4 HAVE THE RIGHT TO ASK HIM TO DO THOSE THINGS. AND THEY 
5 REALIZED THAT NOW -- THEY DIDN'T AT THE TIME APPARENTLY ~ 
6 THAT INTOXICATION REQUIRES SOME KIND OF DISTURBANCE. THE 
7 I TRAIN CASE THAT WE QUOTED FOR YOU AND PUT IN FRONT OF YOU IS 
VERY CLEAR THAT THAT INDIVIDUAL WAS THE ONE CAUSING THE 
91 PROBLEM. THE POLICE HAD BEEN CALLED FOR THAT PROBLEM. THEY 
10 HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE TALKING TO HIM BECAUSE HE WAS THE 
11 ONE CAUSING THE DISTURBANCE UNDER THE PUBLIC INTOXICATION 
12 LAW. IT IS NOT INHERENTLY AGAINST THE LAW TO BE INTOXICATED. 
13 THIS DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT HE -- HE MAY HAVE HAD — MAY HAVE 
14 BEEN SLURRED SPEECH OR SMELL OF ALCOHOL, IS TOTALLY 
15 IMMATERIAL. 
16 THE COURT: BUT ISN'T IT A TWO-PRONG -- A.REN' T YOU ON — 
17 ISN'T IT AGAINST THE LAW TO BE PUBLIC INTOXICATED IN A PUBLIC 
18 PLACE OR UNREASONABLY DISTURB — 
19 MR. ALLEN: NOT ACCORDING TO THE STATUTE. IF YOU READ 
20 THE STATUTE, THEY'RE REQUIRED TO BOTH. AND IT'S VERY 
21 INTERESTING THAT IT'S ALL DARK AND TOTALLY DARK AND THEY'RE 
22 TELLING US HE'S GOT BLOODSHOT EYES FROM FOUR OR FIVE FEET 
23 AWAY. THIS ~ THE POLICE REPORT IN THIS CASE IS ABYSMAL. 
24 THEY REALIZE THAT THEY CAN'T -- THEY HAVE NO REASON 
25 WHATSOEVER TO EVEN APPROACH MR. HENDERSON BECAUSE HE HASN'T 
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DONE A THING. HE'S SITTING THERE OR BACK THERE MINDING HIS 
OWN COMPLETE BUSINESS --
THE COURT: WELL, WHY WOULDN'T THIS BE — WHY WOULDN'T 
THIS BE A TERRY FRISK? IT'S A HIGH-CRIME AREA, IT'S LATE AT 
NIGHT, THEY'VE BEEN CALLED TO A DISTURBANCE. DON'T THEY HAVE 
THE RIGHT TO — 
MR. ALLEN: THEY MIGHT HAVE HAD THE RIGHT TO DO THAT, 
BUT THEY DIDN'T DO THAT. THEY NEVER -- THEY NEVER INVOKED A 
TERRY FRISK. THEY NEVER WALKED UP TO HIM AND SAID — 
THE COURT: WELL, THEY HAD — YOU SAID THEY HAD NO RIGHT 
TO APPROACH HIM. THEY HAD THE RIGHT TO APPROACH HIM, ASK HIM 
WHY HE WAS THERE — 
MR. ALLEN: ANYBODY HAS A RIGHT TO APPROACH, AND THEY 
COULD HAVE — THEY CAN ASK A QUESTION. AND WHEN HE SAYS, I 
DIDN'T DO ANYTHING AND IS HEADING AWAY FROM HIM, I THINK 
THEIR POSITION IS FINISHED UNTIL — 
THE COURT: WAIT A MINUTE -- WAIT A MINUTE — 
MR. ALLEN: -- THEY EITHER — 
THE COURT: NOW, I HAVE TROUBLE WITH THAT. I DON'T 
THINK THAT'S THE STRONGEST POINT OF YOUR CASE. SINCE WHEN 
211 DOES THE PERSON WHO'S ABOUT TO BE ARRESTED GET TO MAKE THAT 
22 DETERMINATION THAT THERE'S NOTHING WRONG? AREN'T THE 
23 OFFICERS ENTITLED UNDER --
24 MR. ALLEN: NO --
25 THE COURT: — A STOP AND FRISK TO MAKE SURE THAT 
35 
1| THEY'RE SAFE AND THAT THERE IS NOTHING GOING ON? I MEAN IF 
2| YOU ASK A THIEF WHAT'S GOING ON, THEY'RE GOING TO TELL YOU 
3| NOTHING'S GOING ON, AND THAT DOES NOT END THE INQUIRY. I 
THINK YOUR STRONGEST ARGUMENT HERE IS THERE'S — HE SHOULD 
5| HAVE ARRESTED HIM AND THERE WAS — 
6I MR. ALLEN: THAT'S MY SECOND ARGUMENT, YOUR HONOR, BUT 
7 BEFORE WE EVER — 
8 THE COURT: I GUESS I'M NOT TELLING --I'M NOT BUYING 
9 THE FIRST ONE. 
10 MR. ALLEN: NO, I — THAT'S THEIR JOB TO TALK ABOUT 
11 WHETHER HE WAS ARRESTED — 
12 THE COURT: I'M NOT BUYING YOUR ARGUMENT. I THINK — I 
13 THINK THIS FALLS INTO A CLASSIC TERRY FRISK APPROACH. NOW, 
14 THE QUESTION BECOMES WHETHER OR NOT THEY CAN ESCALATE THAT 
15 INTO AN ARREST. 
16 MR. ALLEN: THAT MAY BE ACCURATE, YOUR HONOR, BUT THEY 
17 NEVER TOLD HIM THEY WANTED TO FRISK HIM FOR WEAPONS. THEY 
18 NEVER TOLD HIM THEY WERE EXERCISING A TERRY FRISK ON HIM. 
19 THEY'RE JUST GABBING WITH HIM. AND HE TURNS AROUND AND SAYS, 
20 I'M DONE, I'M WALKING AWAY. AND THEY INDICATE THAT HE'S 
21 WALKING AWAY. AND THEY INDICATE THAT HE'S GAINING GROUND AND 
22 WALKING AWAY FROM THEM. AND THEN OFFICER BOOTS, I GUESS IS 
23 ONE THAT DID IT, HE DETERMINES HE'S GONNA GRAB HIS ARM, 
24 ARREST HIM AND TAKE HIM TO THE GROUND, BUT HE DOESN'T SAY 
25 THAT. HE JUST TURNS IT INTO AN INSTANTANEOUS ARREST WITHOUT 
o o 
EVER TELLING HIM HE'S UNDER ARREST, WITHOUT EVER PUTTING HIM 
UNDER ARREST, WITHOUT EVER GIVING ANY REASON WHY, AND 
FRANKLY, NEVER DID — NEVER DID DO WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE DONE 
FOR A TERRY FRISK. IT'S ONE THING TO SAY, I'M CONCERNED THAT 
YOU MAY HAVE A WEAPON. I'M GOING TO SEARCH YOU TO SEE IF 
THAT'S TRUE. THEY NEVER DO THAT. HE'S JUST TALKING. AND HE 
TELLS — HE KNOWS HE HAS NO REASON TO HOLD HIM OR STOP HIM. 
HE SAYS, WOULD YOU MIND, AS HE'S SAID ON THE STAND. AND THE 
FACT THAT HE DOESN'T IMMEDIATELY COMPLY WITH A, WOULD YOU 
MIND, GIVES HIM NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO DO ANYTHING ELSE. NONE. 
AJNU bU ihh INITIAL STOP WE THINK IS VERY, VERY VAGUE AND 
BOGUS. EVEN THE FACT THAT THEY'RE TALK — THAT THEY WENT TO 
TALK TO HIM IN THE FIRST PLACE. AND WE BELIEVE THAT THAT'S 
WHY OFFICER BOOTS NOW IS SAYING, OH, WELL, WE HEARD THIS LOUD 
BANG AND WE — WE — FIRST WE HEARD OF THAT WAS IN 
NATHAN'S — NATHAN'S REBUTTAL AFFIDAVIT AND MEMORANDUM. 
NOTHING IN THE REPORT ABOUT ANY OF THAT. WELL, CLEARLY, IF 
THAT HAPPENED, THAT IS NOT JUST SOMETHING THAT YOU MIGHT PUT 
INTO A REPORT. IT'S THE REASON THAT YOU ARE TALKING TO THIS 
20 1 GUY. AND IF THIS HAPPENED, THEY'D HAVE REPORTED IT. AND 
21 NEITHER OFFICER ROSE ANY INDICATION OF IT. 
22 SECONDLY, WHEN THEY DO MAKE CONTACT WITH HIM FOR 
2 3 WHATEVER REASON, AGAIN, THEY HAVE NO PROBABLE CAUSE, NO 
24 REASONABLE SUSPICION THERE'S ANYTHING WRONG UNTIL THEY 
25 APPROACH HIM. THEN THEY APPROACH HIM. IF THEY DETERMINE 
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1 THAT HE'S PUBLIC INTOXICATED OR CAUSING A DISTURBANCE OR 
2 DOING SOME OF THOSE THINGS, THEIR ARREST MAY BE WRONG, BUT 
3 THEY HAVE THE RIGHT, I GUESS, TO SAY YOU'RE UNDER ARREST, AND 
4 THEN SEE IF HE COMPLIES WITH THE ARREST. THEY DIDN'T DO 
5 THAT. NEVER — NOT ONE WORD ABOUT THAT IN EITHER REPORT. 
6 AND THEY PULL HIM IN, PULL OPEN HIS HAND, AND ALLEGEDLY FIND 
7 I THE CONTRABAND THAT WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED IN THIS 
CASE. AND I THINK YOU'RE RIGHT, THE CASES ARE CLEAR ABOUT 
91 THAT, THAT YOU DON'T HAVE THE RIGHT TO DO THAT UNLESS IT'S A 
10 FULL ARREST, AND THEY NEVER INVOKED THAT. 
11 THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE, MR. LYON? REGARDLESS OF WHAT 
12 YOU SAY, MR. ALLEN HAS ONE MORE SAY, SO IF THERE'S ANYTHING 
13 ELSE YOU'D LIKE TO — 
14 MR. LYON: OKAY. 
15 MR. ALLEN: DON'T HAVE TO. 
16 MR. LYON: YOUR HONOR, I'M A LITTLE BIT TROUBLED. WHAT 
17 IT REALLY COMES DOWN TO IS MR. ALLEN'S CALLING MR. BOOTS A 
18 LIAR. HE'S SAYING BECAUSE IT'S -- BECAUSE THIS BANGING UP 
19 AGAINST THE CARS IS NOT INSIDE THE REPORT THAT IT DIDN'T 
20 HAPPEN. AND OFFICER BOOTS TESTIFIED THAT HE WRITES HIS 
21 REPORTS SO HE CAN REMEMBER WHAT -- TO REFRESH HIS 
22 RECOLLECTION. 
23 THE COURT: BUT WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO YOU AND THE 
24 OFFICER, PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION OUGHT NOT TO 
25 BE LEFT OUT OF A REPORT. 
JO 
MR. LYON: I'M NOT — I WILL NOT ARGUE — 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND THE OFFICER'S SAYING — I ' M NOT 
CALLING HIM A LIAR, BUT PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE 
SUSPICION OUGHT NOT EVER TO BE LEFT OUT OF A REPORT BECAUSE 
MR. ALLEN'S POINT IS WELL TAKEN. WHAT DREW THIS PERSON TO 
THE OFFICER'S ATTENTION IS CRITICAL. THAT'S WHY WE'RE HERE. 
SO I UNDERSTAND YOU CAN'T PUT EVERYTHING IN A POLICE REPORT, 
BUT I REALLY SUSPECT HIS FIELD TRAINING OFFICER WOULD NOT 
APPROVE A REPORT THAT WAS WRITTEN WITHOUT THE REASONABLE 
SUSPICION AND THE PROBABLE CAUSE. AND AGAIN, I'M NOT 
QUESTIONING HIS CHARACTER OR L-HLiLiNb rtiJXl A .LIAR OR ANYTHING 
ELSE, BUT IT SANDBAGS THE DEFENSE BECAUSE THEY SAY, OH, 
THERE'S NO PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE REPORT, AND THEN THE OFFICER 
COMES IN AND THEY HEAR ABOUT IT FOR THE VERY FIRST TIME AT 
THE HEARING. THAT'S TROUBLESOME UNDER ANY — ANY 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
MR. LYON: I WILL CERTAINLY AGREE WITH THAT, WITH YOUR 
HONOR, THAT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PUT IN THE REPORT, BUT I 
THINK TO HOLD IT AGAINST HIM SIMPLY BECAUSE HE FORGOT TO PUT 
201 IT IN I THINK IS UNREASONABLE. 
21 AND I GUESS, YOUR HONOR, WHAT — AND AGAIN, THIS IS — I 
22 THINK IT'S A TOUGH SITUATION BECAUSE, AS OFFICER BOOTS 
23 TESTIFIED, IT ALL HAPPENED SO QUICKLY AND IT'S HARD TO SAY 
24 MAGIC WORDS OR WHATEVER WHEN — WHEN THEY ARE FEARFUL OF 
25 THEIR LIFE AND -- BUT, YOUR HONOR, WHAT -- WHAT HAPPENS IS 
1 THEY'VE GOT THIS INDIVIDUAL THAT'S FUMBLING WITH SOMETHING IN 
2 HIS POCKET THE WHOLE TIME. THEY WANNA SEE WHAT IT IS. AND 
3 IT'S ONLY WHEN THEY TAKE HIS HAND BACK AROUND THAT THEY 
4 DISCOVER IT, THAT THEY SEE IT IN HIS HAND AT THAT TIME. IT'S 
5 NOT FROM A FULL-BLOWN SEARCH OF HIS PERSON. IT'S WHEN THEY 
61 BRING HIS HAND AROUND FOR THEIR OFFICER SAFETY TO PUT IN 
HANDCUFFS THAT THEY SEE THE COCAINE OR WHATEVER THIS IS 
THAT'S — THAT'S INSIDE HIS HAND. 
9 THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU. MR. ALLEN, ANYTHING YOU 
10 WANNA RESPOND TO THAT? 
11 MR. ALLEN: JUST THE ONE THING, AND I FEEL BAD FOR 
12 NATHAN BECAUSE HE'S STUCK WITH THIS SITUATION, BUT THEY WANT 
13 IT BOTH WAYS HERE, JUDGE. THEY WANNA ACT LIKE IT HAPPENED SO 
14 FAST, YET THEY ALSO WANNA SAY, I STOOD THERE AND TALKED TO 
15 HIM FOR A LONG TIME AND IT DIDN'T HAPPEN FAST. WELL, THAT'S 
16 NOT — YOU CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. YOU EITHER HAD TIME TO 
17 SAY ALL THE THINGS YOU SAID YOU COULD, WHICH CLEARLY COULD 
18 HAVE SAID, WELL, YOU'RE UNDER ARREST FOR PUBLIC INTOXICATION, 
19 OR THEY DIDN'T. AND THEY CAN'T SAY WE DID FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
20 TRYING TO MANUFACTURE, IN OUR OPINION, PROBABLE — REASONABLE 
21 SUSPICION, BUT WE DIDN'T WHEN IT CAME TIME TO TELL HIM HE WAS 
22 UNDER ARREST. THAT'S — IT'S BALONEY. 
23 THE COURT: MR. ALLEN, I NEED A LITTLE MORE TIME. I'VE 
24 GOT TWO MORE CASES I GOTTA READ. THE LAW CLERKS PULLED 'EM. 
25 WHEN MR. LYON GOT BACK FROM HIS TOUR LAST WEEK, HE HAND 
4 0 
DELIVERED HIS BRIEF, BUT I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO READ ALL 
OF THE CASES IN HIS BRIEF. NEXT WEEK IS CITY. I'M GONNA 
TAKE IT UNDER ADVISEMENT UNTIL NEXT WEDNESDAY. I GOT TWO 
MORE CASES I GOTTA READ ON THIS MATTER. 
YOU'VE ANSWERED MY QUESTIONS. I'LL TAKE IT UNDER 
ADVISEMENT. WE'LL SEE YOU BACK ON NEXT WEDNESDAY. 
MR. LYON: THANK YOU. 
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2 MR. ALLEN: COULD — DO YOU WANNA CALL NUMBER 28, YOUR 
3 HONOR, IF WE'RE READY ON MR. HENDERSON? 
4 THE COURT 
5 THE CLERK 
6 MR. ALLEN 
WHAT NUMBER IS HE? 
28. 
NUMBER 28. 
THE CLERK: IS MR. BUSHELL (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
MR. BUSHELL: I AM. 
91 THE CLERK: SORRY, I COULDN'T SEE ~ 
10 MR. ALLEN: HE'S SKULKING OVER HERE BEHIND THE PODIUM. 
111 THE COURT: MR. ALLEN, I AGREE WITH THE DEFENSE'S 
12 ANALYSIS ON THIS PARTICULAR SITUATION. I THINK THEY HAD 
13 SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO MAKE A TERRY STOP, BUT I THINK THEY 
14 WENT BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THEIR ABILITY TO SIMPLY TO CHECK FOR 
15 WEAPONS. AND THERE WERE AN ARSENAL OF OTHER REASONS THAT 
16 THEY COULD HAVE AT ANY POINT PUT MR. HENDERSON UNDER ARREST. 
17 AND THOSE WORDS ARE MAGICAL, AND IT CHANGES THE STATUS OF A 
18 PARTICULAR DEFENDANT IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. AND I'M 
19 GRANTING THE DEFENSE'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE. 
20 YOU'LL PREPARE FINDINGS OF FACTS --
21 MR. ALLEN: I WILL, YOUR HONOR. 
22 THE COURT: — SUPPORTING THAT DECISION. AND LIKE I 
23 SAY, MY EMPHASIS IS NOT NECESSARILY ~ I THINK THERE WAS 
24 ENOUGH INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE FOR THEM TO MAKE A TERRY FRISK 
25 AND STOP, BUT AT THAT POINT, THEY WENT IMMEDIATELY INTO 
3 
1 ARREST MODE WITHOUT EVER HAVING PROBABLE CAUSE TO MAKE THE 
2 ARREST, AND WENT WELL BEYOND ANY SCOPE THAT THEY HAD TO CHECK 
3 HIM FOR WEAPONS. AND THE NEXT THING, WITHOUT SAYING THE 
4 MAGIC WORDS, THEY'VE GOT HIM UNDER ARREST AND CHARGED WITH 
51 THINGS. AND SO I'M GRANTING THE MOTION. 
MR. ALLEN: OKAY. 
THE CLERK: DOES THAT NEED TO BE ON COURT REPORTER — 
COURT REPORTER? 
MR. BUSHELL: THIS IS A FIRST DEGREE FELONY. I THINK 
101 THAT HE'S NOT HERE — 
11 THE COURT 
12 MR. ALLEN 
13 THE COURT 
NO, WE WAIVED HIS APPEARANCE — 
YEAH, WE WAIVED HIS, AND I'M ASSUMING OUR — 
YEAH. 
14 1 MR. ALLEN: — VIDEO WOULD DO THIS. NOW, ONE QUESTION I 
15 HAVE IS WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE — WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS A 
16 RATHER GROSS DISPARITY BETWEEN WHAT THE TWO OFFICERS WROTE IN 
17 THEIR POLICE REPORT AND WHAT THEY THEN TESTIFIED TO AT THIS 
18 HEARING. HOW DO I HANDLE THAT, YOUR HONOR? I THINK THAT'S 
19 AN ISSUE. IT SHOULD BE RESERVED. IF THE — THE WAY THINGS 
20 ARE GOING, STATE SOMETIMES APPEALS THESE THINGS. 
21 THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, THE DIFFICULTY IS, I DON'T HAVE 
22 TO REACH THAT ISSUE TO RESOLVE IT. I SIMPLY DON'T THINK I 
23 HAVE TO REACH THAT ISSUE TO RESOLVE IT. YOU'VE BEEN ASSUMING 
24 WHAT EITHER OFFICER SAID TO BE THE TRUTH. I THINK THEY — 
25 THEY HAVE — THEY CAN MAKE A TERRY STOP AND FRISK, BUT AT 
1 THAT POINT, THEY GO WELL BEYOND ANY SCOPE TO CHECK FOR 
2 WEAPONS OR FOR THEIR OWN PROTECTION. AND THEY END UP IN A 
3 FULL-FLEDGED ARREST WITHOUT EVER TELLING HIM THAT HE WAS 
4 ARRESTED. I GUESS IMPLICITY, IT MEANS THAT, YOU KNOW, I 
5 DIDN'T FIND ANY CREDIBILITY IN THOSE PARTICULAR SITUATIONS. 
6 MR. ALLEN: OKAY. 
7 THE COURT: I DON'T THINK I CAN RESOLVE THE SITUATION 
8 WHERE THERE WAS NO MENTION IN THE POLICE REPORT ABOUT THE 
9 INTOXICATION AND THE GLASSY EYES AND THE BANG WITH THE 
10 GARBAGE AND ALL THOSE OTHER THINGS. THAT CAME OUT ON THE 
11 STAND. THE OFFICER EXPLAINED WHY HE DIDN'T PUT THAT IN HIS 
12 REPORT. I WOULD CONCEDE THERE IS A DISPARITY BETWEEN HIS 
13 TESTIMONY AND WHAT HE PUT IN HIS REPORT, BUT HIS EXPLANATION 
14 MAY COVER THAT, THAT HE DOESN'T PUT EVERYTHING IN HIS REPORT 
15 BUT I'M ALSO ON THE RECORD AT THE TIME OF THE MOTION TO 
16 SUPPRESS TO TELL HIM THAT PROBABLE CAUSE IS ESSENTIAL, AND 
17 THAT'S NOT SOMETHING THAT YOU LEAVE OUT OF YOUR REPORT. 
18 MR. ALLEN: OKAY. GOT IT. AND THEN, MS. NEIDER, AFTER 
19 THEY'VE PREPARED THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, I 
2 0 GUESS MR. LYON WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT HE HAS ANY 
21 KIND OF CASE AT ALL IF THE EVIDENCE IS SUPPRESSED. I DOUBT 
22 IT GIVEN THE TENOR OF THE TESTIMONY, BUT THE STATE STILL HAS 
23 A RIGHT TO EITHER APPEAL --
24 MS. NEIDER: THE DEFENDANT IS DOWN AT THE PRISON; IS 
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THE COURT: DID MR. ALLEN LEAVE? MR. ALLEN, WILL YOU 
COME BACK UP? 
MR. LYON'S FILED A MOTION. HE WANTED CLARIFICATION ON 
THE MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON. DID YOU GET A COPY OF THIS? 
I'M PREPARED TO (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
MR. LYON: BERNIE, I SENT THAT OVER TO RYAN BECAUSE I 
THOUGHT HE'S HANDLING THE CASE. 
THE CLERK: JUDGE, WE NEED TO RECALL (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
THE COURT: OKAY. WE'LL COME BACK TO IT. 
THIS IS STATE OF UTAH VERSUS MICHAEL HENDERSON. I'M 
PREPARED. I WENT BACK AND LISTENED TO IT. I DID SAY THAT 
THE POLICE PROBABLY DID HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO MAKE AN ARREST 
ON THE FIRST RULING. BUT THE ISSUE WAS WHETHER OR NOT THE 
POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO DETAIN MR. HENDERSON IN THE 
FIRST TIME. AND MY RULING ON THE SECOND ONE WAS THEY WENT 
OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF WHAT I THOUGHT THEY HAD THE AUTHORITY IT 
TO DETAIN HIM FOR --
191 MR. ALLEN: RIGHT. 
20 THE COURT: — AND THEREFORE, THEY DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE 
21 CAUSE — 
22 MR. ALLEN 
23 THE COURT 
2 4 MR. ALLEN 
25 THE COURT 
TO ARREST HIM. 
— TO DETAIN HIM IN THE FIRST PLACE — 
RIGHT. 
- - AND SO I SUPPRESSED THE EVIDENCE BASED 
1 UPON THAT INITIAL THING. 
2 NOW, ONCE THE POLICE ARE WITH HIM, AND THEY GOT INTO 
3 THE -- THE PHYSICAL ALTERCATION AND THE ALLEGED REFUSAL AND 
4 EVERYTHING ELSE, I DID FEEL THE POLICE COULD HAVE PUT HIM 
5 UNDER ARREST, BUT I DON'T HAVE TO GET TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER 
61 OR NOT THEY HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST HIM BECAUSE I FELT 
THEY WENT OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE THEIR REASONABLE SUSPICION 
TO DETAIN HIM AND STOP HIM IN THE FIRST PLACE. SO WHILE — 
91 YOU KNOW, ONCE THE POLICE DETAIN SOMEBODY AND THEN SOMEONE 
10 GETS PHYSICAL WITH THEM, THERE MAY VERY WELL HAVE BEEN 
11 PROBABLE CALLS TO ARREST. DON'T HAVE TO GET THERE. THEY 
12 DIDN'T HAVE -- THEY WENT BEYOND THEIR SCOPE IN DETAINING HIM 
13 ON A TERRY__STOP IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND THERE WAS NO 
14 REASONABLE SUSPICION OR PROBABLE CAUSE TO DETAIN HIM IN THE 
15 FIRST_PLACE. SO THERE WAS INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS, BUT I 
161 DON'T HAVE TO GET TO THE ISSUE OF PROBABLE CALLS FOR THE 
ARREST. 
MR. ALLEN: OKAY. 
MR. LYON: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) I GUESS SO I'M 
UNDERSTANDING, YOU'RE NOT — YOU'RE NOT GOING TO RULE 
SPECIFICALLY ON THE ISSUE OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
THE COURT: NO, I DID MAKE ~ I DID MAKE THE COMMENT 
THAT IF THE OFFICERS WOULD HAVE AT ANY TIME PLACED HIM UNDER 











1 OUTSIDE THEIR SCOPE IN DETAINING HIM IN THE FIRST PLACE. ON 
2 A TERRY STOP AND FRISK, THEY HAD NO — THEY HAD NO BELIEF — 
3 NO REASON TO BEGIN TO PURSUING (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
4 MR. LYON: BUT THAT THEY DID HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION 
5 TO MAKE A TERRY STOP. 
6 THE COURT: THEY COULD HAVE STOPPED HIM, BUT THEN THEY 
7 WENT BEYOND THE SCOPE, WAS MY RULING. MR. ALLEN — 
8 MR. LYON: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
9 THE COURT: — DISAGREES WITH THAT, BUT THEY WENT BEYOND 
10 THE SCOPE. THEY GET TO PAT HIM DOWN FOR WEAPONS. THEY DON'T 
111 GET TO GRAB HIM, THEY DON'T GET TO KlAKE HIM STAY THERE, THEY 
12 DON'T GET TO MAKE HIM DO ALL KINDS OF THINGS. THEY SIMPLY 
13 SHOULD HAVE PATTED HIM DOWN AND EITHER SENT HIM ON HIS WAY OR 
14 NOT. THEY DID NOT DO THAT. MY RULING WAS THEY WENT BEYOND 
15 THE SCOPE OF THEIR PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION. 
16 MR. LYON: OKAY. 
17 THE COURT: MR. ALLEN, YOU'RE STILL DOING THE PAPERWORK, 
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1 THE COURT: RIGHT, THAT'S COPRECT. 
2 MR. ALLEN: HE IS. AND THAT'S ALWAYS (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
3 MS. NEIDER: DO YOU WANNA GIVE HIM A TIME TO REPORT ON 
4 THAT, JUDGE? 
5 THE COURT: WELL, I FIGURED HE MAY EVEN APPEAL, SO I WAS 
6 GONNA WAIT UNTIL MR. ALLEN PREPARED HIS FINDINGS OF FACTS, 
7| AND THEN YOU HAVE 30 DAYS FROM THEN TO DECIDE WHETHER TO 
APPEAL OR NOT, SO — 
91 MR. ALLEN: YEAH, WE'LL DO IT RIGHT AWAY. 
10 THE COURT: -- UNTIL MR. ALLEN -- ONCE MR. ALLEN GETS 
11 THAT DONE, THEN YOU'LL HAVE 30 DAYS TO DECIDE. IF HE DECIDES 
12 TO APPEAL, THEN WE'LL WAIT AND SEE HOW THE APPEAL GO. IF HE 
13 DOESN'T, THEN THE 30 DAYS, WE'RE DONE. HE'LL HAVE TO DECIDE 
14 WHETHER HE'S GONNA BE ABLE TO PROSECUTE AT THAT POINT. 
15 MR. BUSHELL: JUDGE, I'LL BE PREPARING THOSE. 
16 MR. ALLEN: BASED ON WHAT MR. LYON TOLD ME AT THE 
17 HEARING, I DON'T THINK HE'LL APPEAL IT, BUT THERE IS THAT 
18 POSSIBILITY. 
19 THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. 
20 MR. ALLEN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
21 THE CLERK: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
22 THE COURT: PROBABLY RIGHT FOR OUR PURPOSES. 
23 THE CLERK: GO LIKE TWO MONTHS THEN? 
24 THE COURT: YEAH, GO TO APRIL 26TH. 
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